The numbers game

Four presidential contenders, the possibility of vote-rigging, dissatisfaction and new optimism – with so many factors in play, the outcome of the March 29 elections is anyone’s guess. Here, the Research and Advocacy Unit and States in Transition Observatory suggest some possible scenarios.

The forthcoming elections are provoking considerable excitement, mainly over whether Robert Mugabe will survive the most serious challenge yet to his political hegemony. However, it seems very difficult to anticipate what outcomes there could be in early April.

Section 110(3) of the Electoral Act states that the winner in the first round of a presidential election must have an absolute majority of the valid votes cast, However, however Paragraph 3 suggests that the Chief Election Officer has the power to declare as the winner the candidate with the “greater” or the “greatest” number of votes. Paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule is a hang-over from the previous Electoral Act, and, if the principles of good legislative interpretation were followed – which may not be the case – then the substantive clause, Section 110(3), should prevail.

The relevance for this discussion is that Mugabe may fall back on what one commentator has called the “sophisticated” Kibaki strategy if he fails to get the absolute majority he needs. He gets the Chief Election Officer to declare him the winner, even if he only gets 49 per cent or less of the vote – as long as he has more than the others – and then argues the toss in the courts. He can avoid the “crude” Kibaki strategy of just getting himself declared the winner by using the contradiction in the Electoral Act between Section 110(3) and Paragraph 3 of the Second Schedule.

However, elections are complex processes, and, whilst they are evidently about the transfer or maintenance of political power between parties, they are also about popularity.

So, for Mugabe, it is essential that he and Zanu (PF) win both the presidential and the parliamentary elections with clear majorities. This will allow him to be sworn in by the Chief Justice, to demand the allegiance of the armed services and chiefs and to continue to claim sovereignty and forestall any external interference. If he were to win the presidency, but lose the parliament or have the opposition get a blocking third of the seats, as they did in 2000, he would have considerable difficulty governing, let alone convincing the world at large that he remained a popular leader.

Now, for the first time in Zimbabwe’s history, it is not a foregone conclusion that Zanu (PF) will win, and we are faced with a multiplicity of contenders of real substance. We also have many indicators of severe dissatisfaction with Mugabe, but this may not translate into dissatisfaction with the party itself.  

All of this suggests a large number of possible outcomes, which are dependent on a wide range of factors: the effectiveness of the current vote-buying, the success of rigging, the control of the electoral machinery, and, of course, the ways in which the electorate will vote.

Taking the first scenario, which is predicated on Mugabe winning the presidential election, there are three sub-scenarios. Here it is assumed that Mugabe may have won (legitimately or not) and, of course, an illegitimate victory would probably be challenged by the losers, whether in the courts or by other political action. A clear majority is seen as questionable in all three sub-scenarios as, on present evidence, it does not seem that Robert Mugabe is very popular anywhere in the country. But, notwithstanding the manner of victory, it can be seen that this victory may be accompanied by a series of different developments: Zanu (PF) could win the parliamentary elections with either a clear two-thirds majority or less than this; Zanu (PF) could also end up with less than a majority and even less than two-thirds.

In the first sub-scenario, Mugabe would be president and, assuming that his candidates of choice won their seats in the parliamentary elections, we would remain in the status quo. He could govern, use his presidential powers, make changes to the constitution, pass budgets, and keep the world off his back. Court challenges to his victory he could manage, as he has done before, by just dragging the process out interminably, and, providing the army continued its support, he could deal easily with internal dissent.

In the second sub-scenario, Mugabe would not have quite the same legislative powers, and his credibility would be severely damaged by the demonstration that his party was no longer as popular as it appeared in 2005. He would also be vulnerable to parliamentary attack, if Zanu (PF) dissidents were to start allying themselves with the positions of the opposition, and the fractures within Zanu (PF) might become more and more apparent.

The third scenario would leave Mugabe in obvious danger. If the opposition – MDC and independents – were to have either a majority in parliament or, more seriously, had a greater than two-thirds majority, he would not be able to govern at all, could be vulnerable to direct personal attack by impeachment or the like, and his political credibility would be irrevocably damaged.

Furthermore, if his victory were not genuinely won, he would be in very serious trouble in this situation.

However, having three substantial candidates for the presidential election raises other possibilities, and the most likely is that no-one gets an absolute majority in the first round. This seems very possible, given that Tsvangirai got 42 per cent of the vote in 2002, and these were genuine votes.

Assuming some loss of popularity for Tsvangirai, it still seems likely that he would get about 35 per cent of the vote. Makoni would then only need to get 15 per cent for there to have to be a run-off, and, given the reported dissatisfaction within Zanu (PF) for Mugabe’s continuation in power, this might be a little on the conservative side. A betting man would not agree with Makoni that he would get 70 per cent of the vote, but it would seem a safe bet to suggest that he would do much better than a mere 15 per cent. If the electorate split their votes between Tsvangirai and Makoni, then Mugabe might even go out at the first round, but this seems unlikely.

Thus, a run-off seems very probable and opens up many more scenarios, none of which look very promising for Mugabe, and here the results of the parliamentary elections become crucial. It should be remembered that the run-off would take place three weeks after the parliamentary elections were finalised, so the balance of forces in parliament would be known.

In the two sub-scenarios where Zanu (PF) has won a clear two-thirds majority in parliament, Mugabe would have the possibility of doing a deal with the malcontents in the party. If he had to run off against Tsvangirai, he might be able to persuade the Makoni faction and others to support him, probably in exchange for a clear process of succession to Makoni.  

This would depend enormously on whether the Zanu (PF) malcontents would trust Mugabe to keep his word, and also on the support they had in parliament. Constitutional Amendment 18 provides for the election of the president by parliament, so succession could happen quickly, but whether the dissenters would trust Mugabe would depend on who the chosen heir or heiress was, and how confident they were that they could control Mugabe in parliament.

Nonetheless, these two scenarios would leave Mugabe vulnerable and having to bargain from a position of weakness.

The sub-scenario where the opposition has a blocking third in parliament is considerably less comfortable for Mugabe. In the event of a run-off against Makoni, he would face the clear danger that the opposition would support Makoni and he would lose.  

Even if he were to win, he would have all the difficulties in governing mentioned earlier, plus his own credibility would be seriously questioned due to the proof that he was not popular. He would also have great difficulties in making some sort of deal with his dissenters, as electing his successor through parliament might be problematic. The opposition and the Makoni supporters would have much more power in determining the choice of heir, which would not suit Mugabe at all.

The other sub-scenarios, where the opposition has a majority or a two-thirds majority in parliament, place Mugabe in much more danger. A run-off against Tsvangirai, where the opposition already had a majority, could easily lead to a Tsvangirai victory, where the electorate sensed an easy opportunity to get rid of him, and the poll might then become a test of his popularity only.  

Much the same could happen with a run-off against Makoni, but the difference here would be that the opposition would not fear a Makoni presidency since they controlled the house. The key is that even the rural electorate might sense Mugabe’s weakness and take the opportunity to shift allegiances – not so unlikely given the economic crisis and the very palpable food shortage.   

Although the general trend in the rural electorate has been to vote for whom they think will win, and this has been so clearly Mugabe to date, the politics of patronage might well fall apart in the run-off situation where the rural populace get the notion that Mugabe will lose.

So, making the assumption that the process of the elections do not matter essentially, it can be seen that Robert Mugabe will only be secure in one of the nine scenarios. Unless he can ensure, by either his popularity or rigging, that he wins the presidential election by an absolute majority, and that Zanu (PF) has an unassailable majority in parliament, all the other outcomes place him at risk.