Of all the claims made, the claim that earned the most
extensive media coverage was also the least well substantiated: evidence for
the contention that the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was
resorting to violence appears to have been sourced from Zimbabwean
state-owned media, Robert Mugabe himself, Joint Operations Command member
and police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, and an unnamed Zimbabwean cabinet
minister. That a well-respected institution such as the HSRC thought to make
so serious an allegation based on input from such implausible sources was
bad enough, but it then issued a recommendation on the basis of such
flimsily supported claims: that members of the global community push for
sanctions targeting both Zanu PF and the MDC so that they desist from
violence.
Surprisingly, the report’s most important and best-sourced information has
thus far been overlooked. Given what seems almost unprecedented access to
sources in SA’s Presidency, foreign affairs department and embassy in
Zimbabwe, the report’s authors are able to provide a detailed exposition of
the South African leadership’s motivations in respect of their mediation
role and as influential neighbour. According to the authors, “SA’s
transitional formula in Zimbabwe has been to induce a re-engineering and
transformation of Zanu PF to put it in the hands of a moderate and avoid the
Chiluba factor’ – the decimation of a liberation party by a trade-union
party like the MDC.” It is this motivation that led to support for Simba
Makoni’s candidacy in the belief that he could spearhead a reformed Zanu PF
party incorporating certain elements of the political opposition, notably
the Arthur Mutambara-led faction of the MDC.
SA bet on a runoff scenario. But one that involved Makoni and Mugabe and
not, as it happened, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and Mugabe. All this
manoeuvring took place supposedly to leave Tsvangirai out in the cold but
Pretoria, say the authors, was taken aback by Makoni’s dismal results. Still
it wasn’t deterred, continuing to push for Makoni as a central figure in a
government of national unity well past the date on which election results
were known. It would almost be funny – bungled strategy predicated on
bumbling intelligence – were it not so malign. How, if these are Mbeki’s
motivations, confirmed by senior officials in relevant government
departments, can it then be fairly or sensibly insisted that the
Tsvangirai-led MDC be party to any continued mediation effort brokered by
Mbeki? The Tsvangirai-led MDC, recognising that Mbeki’s efforts are often
driven less by support for Mugabe than revilement for itself, has called at
every turn for supplementation of the mediation effort. Had a United Nations
(UN) Security Council draft resolution not been defeated two weeks ago, it
would have allowed for the appointment of a UN special representative to
“support the negotiation process between the political parties in Zimbabwe”.
But SA was having none of it, leading off the debate in the security council
that preceded the vote. SA’s UN ambassador, Dumisani Kumalo, suggested that
SA’s hands were tied. It had no choice but to vote against the draft,
duty-bound as it was to uphold the Southern African Development Community
and African Union positions safeguarding the mediation process  as if SA
hadn’t exerted every pressure in those self-same institutions to ensure that
its mediation remained the only game in town. And so the MDC has found
itself not only corralled into the very process to which it has time and
again raised objection, but is also refused alternatives on the basis that
such alternatives would compromise the flawed process to which it objects.
It is hard to imagine how Tsvangirai conducts himself with any civility in
Mbeki’s company. But by all accounts he does: when relations were at one of
their lowest ebbs, Tsvangirai still met with Mbeki in Harare, reportedly
telling him that he was meeting with him not as the mediator but as the
democratically elected head of the people of SA. If true, it is a courtesy
Mbeki has been resolutely unwilling to return to Tsvangirai or to the people
of Zimbabwe. Now, however, with last Friday’s appointment of a reference
group, there appears finally to be recognition that a mediation effort
brokered solely by Mbeki cannot yield the unprejudiced process that is so
desperately required.
Fritz is the director of the Southern Africa Litigation Centre
Post published in: Opinions