How did a well-meaning, authentic liberation movement as Frelimo end up assisting a party [Zanu PF] that they regarded as disgraceful, instead of its natural ally – Zapu?
On 7 to 8 March 1968, Frelimo – who were fighting the colonial Portuguese government in Mozambique – opened the Tete front in that country adjoining Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia. As Frelimo consolidated their position in this war zone, a new corridor was opened for infiltration of guerrillas and armaments into north-eastern Rhodesia. As expected, they turned to their natural ally’ Zapu, to begin the war in that area.
However, they found Zapu embroiled in fierce leadership squabbles, and was clearly not prepared for any military action. One Frelimo official was quoted at the time as saying, …it was not the fighters (Zipra) who refused. It was the Zapu leadership’.
Frelimo, which was eager to see military action in Rhodesia, was left with no choice, but to reluctantly establish links with Zanu – starting with a tentative meeting at Dar es Salaam’s Twiga Hotel in 1968, when Eduardo Mondlane, then leader of Frelimo, and Samora Machel met then Zanu Chairman Herbert Chitepo and secretary for defence Noel Mukono.
Even when agreement was eventually agreed upon for Frelimo and Zanu to work together in May 1970, Machel made it very clear to Zanu that this decision did not mean that Frelimo supported them, meaning that Zapu was still its partner, saying, We don’t support Zanu. We support Zapu. But we also support the people of Zimbabwe and anyone who can show us he can start a revolution in Zimbabwe’.
But still the question begs an answer. Why was Zapu reluctant to wage a liberation struggle, even when Frelimo persistently preferred them? George Silundika, one of Zapu’s three principal leaders in exile, later explained that at the time of the invitations by Frelimo, Zapu was in a political mess.
James Chikerema (vice president, leader in exile and head of the defence department) and Jason Z. Moyo (second man in the defence department) were not co-operating with each other. But what were these problems?
Differences within Zapu had begun to emerge in 1967 between Chikerema and J.Z. Moyo. Chikerema – who hailed from the same area as Mugabe – wanted to follow his kinsman’s ideology of tribalism, destroy Zapu and set up one Zezuru-led party.
Having gathered for himself a strong Shona following, he did all he could to destroy Zapu. In 1969, he even allowed a British television crew to film a Zipra training camp in Zambia, thereby, compromising the security of the guerrillas. He went further and dissolved the party executive and army command, and vesting all powers in himself, thereby, managing to divide the Zipra guerrillas in the camps on tribal lines, resulting in intense fighting amongst them.
After satisfying himself that Zapu was as good as dead, and that he had acquired sufficient Shona supporters from the party, he finally revealed his true intentions. He proposed unity with Zanu, as he knew very well that Zanu’s split from Zapu in 1963 was tribalistic.
However, there was still a problem. Zanu’s top brass at the time were not Zezuru as he was, and therefore, not conducive for the grand plan. Zanu had, so far, used the anti-Ndebele card to split from Zapu, but the time had come for the non-Zezuru leadership of Zanu to be removed.
As such, whilst Chikerema was conducting official talks with Chitepo and Mukudzei Mudzi (administrative secretary), he was also having more frequent unofficial talks with Nathan Shamuyarira and Taziana Mutizwa – Zezuru members of the Zanu supreme council.
In fact, the Zanu president Ndabaningi Sithole, his vice Leopold Takawira and Chitepo were not Zezuru and were not what the conspirators desired. However, the next in the hierarchy – Robert Mugabe – was a Zezuru, and the man for the job. But as he was incarcerated, Shamuyarira and Mutizwa were the link between him and Chikerema.
It is most likely that the scheme to destroy Zapu from within, and thus, incapacitate it as an effective liberation force, was mooted by Mugabe. It is also clear that he (Mugabe) was the brains behind the scheme to remove all non-Zezuru leaders of the liberation’ movement.
Chikerema proceeded to leak’ to the British media the fallacy that Sithole and Joshua Nkomo (then Zapu president) had stepped down in favour of Mugabe, in Salisbury Central Prison. However, after the scheme was known, Chitepo pulled out of the unity talks.
As expected, this did not go down well with the Zezuru elements in Zanu, with Shamuyarira subsequently challenging Chitepo for the chairmanship of the supreme council. However, he (Shamuyarira) lost, and at the 1971 review conference, lost his place on the council and a few days later resigned from Zanu – maybe in the hope that other Zezurus will follow suit and form another party. However, that would have been political suicide, as they were unlikely to receive any recognition from the international community.
Whether or not what later transpired in Zanu – the assassinations and revolts – leading to Mugabe becoming president, were part of the plan or not, the fact still remains that Mugabe’s machinations were sinister.
* Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a Zimbabwean independent political and social commentator, who is writing a book, entitled The Zimbabwe Liberation Struggle – Land Hunger or Power Hunger?’