Local leaders organised xenophobic violence: Report

sa_police_fire.jpgSouth African police fire rubber bullets during xenophobic violence last year












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Executive Summary

Although violence against foreign nationals and other outsiders' has been a long-

standing feature of post-Apartheid South Africa, the intensity and scale of the May

2008 attacks were extraordinary.

What started off as an isolated incidence of anti- foreigner violence
in Alexandra on 11 May, quickly spread to other townships and informal
settlements across the country. After two weeks and the deployment of
the Army, the violence subsided. In its wake, 62 people, including 21
South Africans, were dead; at least 670 wounded; dozens of women raped;
and at least 100 000 persons displaced and property worth of millions
of Rand looted, destroyed or seized by local residents and leaders.

The attacks stimulated a range of pronouncements and accounts from political and

community leaders, scholars, media and civil society. There was also a proliferation

of explanations regarding the root and immediate causes, as well as appropriate

strategies for short, medium and long-term interventions. However, many of the

earlier recommendations were premised on outdated or inaccurate information, and

if implemented, could be ineffective or potentially exacerbate xenophobia and related

violence.

Recognising the need for an objective, politically neutral account of the attacks, this

report presents the findings of a baseline study commissioned by IOM
and conducted by the Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) at Wits
University in Johannesburg.

Funded by the UK's Department for International Development and
involving almost five months of field work in seven sites in Gauteng,
and the Western Cape, its main objective was to move beyond much of the
existing work that focused largely on attitudes and perceptions.

Instead, this study outlines the political economy of violence
against outsiders and the immediate triggers and factors that helped
translate xenophobic attitudes into the violent attacks witnessed in
May 2008. These same triggers and incentives account for much of the
violence that preceded May 2008. If not adequately addressed, they
could result in future violence against both foreign nationals and
South African citizens.

Primary Findings and Conclusions

There are broad structural and historical factors that led to the May 2008 violence

including the legacy of institutional discrimination and generalised mistrust among

citizens, police, and the elected leaders.

But these cannot explain the location and timing of the attacks.
Similarly, this study finds little evidence to support early accounts
blaming the eruption of the violence on a third force', poor border
control, changes in national political leadership, or rising food and
commodity prices. These factors may have contributed to generalised
tensions, but they cannot explain why violence occurred in some places
and not others.

In explaining the timing and location of violence, this study's
findings are that in almost all cases where violence occurred, it was
organised and led by local groups and individuals in an effort to claim
or consolidate the authority and power needed to further their
political and economic interests.

It therefore finds that most violence against non-nationals and other
outsiders' which occurred in May 2008 is rooted in the micro-politics
of the country's townships and informal settlements. By comparing
affected and non-affected areas, this report shows that only a trusted,
competent and committed leadership (from grassroots

to high-level officialdom) can make a significant difference in terms
of preventing social tensions from turning into xenophobic violence.

Beyond these broad conclusions, the research identifies a number of
common factors that fostered violence in those places where it
occurred. These include:

1. Institutionalised practices that exclude foreigners from political
participation and justice; Often premised on limited knowledge of
and respect for the country's laws and policies, these practices
continue to criminalise and villanise foreign nationals and other
outsiders'.

2. A lack of trusted, prompt and effective conflict resolution mechanisms that leads to vigilantism and mob justice.

3. Political vacuums or competition in community leadership that
encourages the emergence of unofficial, illegitimate and often violent
forms of local leadership that enhance their authority and power by
reinforcing communities' resentment towards what is perceived as
non-compliant' foreign nationals.

4 .A culture of impunity with regard to public violence in general and
xenophobic violence in particular that encourages the ill-intentioned
to attack non-nationals and other outsiders for personal and/or
political gain.

In responding to the threats and outbreaks of violence, the study finds that local

leaders and police were typically reluctant to intervene on behalf of victims. In some

cases, this was because they supported the community's hostile attitudes towards

foreign nationals. In others, they feared losing legitimacy and
political positions if they were seen as defending unpopular groups. In
almost all instances, local leaders and police spoke of their
incapacity to counter violence and violent tendencies within their
communities.

While many non-nationals who fled in fear of the violence have returned to their

communities, the study finds that return and reintegration is either undesirable or

impossible where foreign nationals' property has been appropriated by local residents

and leaders or where community leaders were actively involved in the violence. The

study did not identify any local or national government initiative
dedicated to preparing potentially hostile communities for the return
or reintegration of displaced non-nationals. Nor did it uncover any
systematic effort to hold accountable those responsible for the
violence.

Recommendations

Anti-outsider violence is deeply rooted in South Africa's historical
legacies and contemporary institutional configurations. Government,
civil society, and international organisations must work together to
finds ways of replacing vigilantism with vigilance and power vacuums
with a leadership committed to inclusive, equitable, and law abiding
communities.

It is not only non-nationals' welfare that depends on the success of
these efforts. Without mechanisms to address conflict and exclusion, we
risk the security and dignity of all South Africans living in the
country's townships and informal settlements.

If supported by political will and resources, the following
recommendations may help to counter xenophobic tendencies and reduce
the risk of future violence:

1. Develop interventions to promote accountability and counter a culture of impunity:

There is little hope of reforming corrupt and potentially violent leadership structures

if guilty parties continue to reap rewards for their misdeeds.

The Department of Justice together with the Department of Provincial
and Local Government (DPLG), and the National Prosecuting Authority
(NPA) should lead an initiative to prosecute community leaders and
others involved in the xenophobic violence and to strengthen justice
mechanisms to protect the rights of minority and marginalised groups.

Such an initiative should begin with an official Commission of
Inquiry potentially by the South African Human Rights Commission or
another constitutionally mandated body to identify guilty parties and
unacceptable practices. Further efforts will lay criminal charges
against official and unofficial leaders who used their authority to
promote violence and illegal activities, or employ crime prevention and
conflict resolution mechanisms that do not respect the rights of all
community residents.

2. However, criminal prosecution on its own will not be enough. Resources and

mechanisms should be put in place to encourage existing civil society organisations

to support the rights and welfare of non-nationals along with other marginalised and

vulnerable groups. In the short term, election-monitoring mechanisms should be put

in place to ensure that officials are not elected on an anti-foreigner/ anti-outsider

platform.

3. Promote positive reforms to build inclusive local governance structures: As much

of the violence is rooted in exclusive local politics, DPLG and others should identify

and promote positive leadership models and leaders committed to tolerance and

the rule of law.

In all cases, interventions must be wary of empowering unscreened'

community leadership structures such as street committees and other forums. Doing

so may entrench the power of the same unscrupulous leaders who were responsible

for the violence or promote others so inclined. Instead, we must find and support

positive examples like those in Alexandra and Tembisa where community leaders

successfully mobilised their constituencies to prevent the violence.

Mechanisms within the public administration and political parties
should encourage such efforts to build more inclusive and rights-based
forms of governance. Doing so will require more inclusive community
justice mechanisms, a more effective and responsive police service, and
legal support for disenfranchised and marginalised groups.

4. Open up more channels for legal migration: Government should consider opening

up more channels for legal migration, such an approach would not only encourage

legal migration and help reverse clandestine migration, it could also help reduce

the us vs them' mentality that contributed to the attacks. Furthermore, it could

contribute towards reducing corruption, labour exploitation and other practices that

undermine the rights and welfare of both South African and foreign nationals.

5. Support government to address xenophobic and discriminatory practices in public

institutions: Donors and civil society should encourage and support government's

efforts towards eliminating xenophobic and discriminatory practices in public

institutions. Efforts to counter these practices can begin with sensitisation of public

officials.

6. Promote a human rights culture among the people of South Africa:
Leaders, citizens, and non-nationals should be made aware of rights,
entitlements and responsibilities of various categories of foreign
nationals. Effective interventions should not be limited to appeals to
tolerance, but must also draw attention to the country's laws, the
rights of different groups, mechanisms for countering discrimination,
and the negative consequences of not respecting the law and rights of
all.

7. Conduct ongoing, systematic inquiries into anti-immigrant and anti-outsider

violence and the political economy of township life: This report is only the first step

in understanding the actions and tensions that led to violence. Future intervention

strategies designed without a clear appreciation of the violence and the reasons

behind could be ineffective and counter-productive.

Future steps must move beyond finger pointing over the May attacks,
and encourage and enable local government and emerging leadership
structures to be more proactive in building mechanisms that enhance the
rights and ability of all residents to participate in planning their
community's future. It is crucial to note this study's finding that
perceptions and misrepresentations played an important role in
triggering anti-foreigner violence.

The dissemination of factually based reports and information can help counter

existing negative attitudes among the members of public that lend credence to

the criminalisation' of foreign nationals. Activists and advocacy groups should also

find ways to use the media and other available platforms to disseminate research

results that may counter such misconceptions.

8. Recognising the difficulties of achieving the reforms outlined above, Government

should work together with International Organisations (e.g., IOM, UNHCR, OCHA)

and civil society to develop early conflict and disaster warning and management

systems: Local government should be capacitated to monitor ethnic and political

divides and tensions that may escalate into widespread violence.

Non-nationals and other local minority groups (also considered as
outsiders) are particularly vulnerable to such conflicts, although
political tensions may also affect other long-term residents. Similar
mechanisms may be put in place to monitor natural

disasters.

In all cases, such monitoring mechanisms must be supported by rapid

response systems and conflict resolution mechanisms involving the police, religious

institutions, the courts, and other available mechanisms that can help forestall mob

violence, address concerns and conflict, and prosecute those unwilling to respect

the rights and dignity of all community residents.

9. Sensitise and capacitate media to undertake responsible reporting on migrants and

migration issues: Implement programmes to capacitate the media to understand

the different categories of migrants, the various aspects of migration, and the

rights and responsibilities of migrants, in order to promote responsible and factual

reporting about migrants and migration, based on proper investigation.

This will help to reduce the prejudices and stereotypes that are
fostered by irresponsible media reporting that tends to refer to
migrants generally as illegal immigrants'. There are no guarantees
that the mechanisms outlined above will prevent future attacks targeted
at foreign nationals or other minority groups. However, in the absence
of such measures, we may witness further social fragmentation,
disrespect for human rights and the law, resulting in further violence.

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