Threats to the transition and hints of a coup

but a wide range of problems could return the country to where it was a year ago – on the edge of collapse – if Zanu (PF) and the military leadership maintain an intransigent stance on the reforms for economic and political stability, an international political think-thank said last week.

(Pictured: (Caption) Armando Guebuza The Mozambican President and chairman of the SADC organ on politics, peace and security tasked to monitor the Zimbabwean situation)

In a report titled Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) said the Southern African Development Community (SADC) guarantor of the Zimbabwe power-sharing agreement must press the Harare parties particularly President Robert Mugabe to see the promising but troubled transition through to a successful conclusion. Excerpts from the report:

Despite the current stalemate on outstanding GPA issues, there is some prospect that compromises can eventually be reached, though only with the help of intense mediation. However, security sector reform firmly rejected by Mugabe has emerged as a key challenge.

Failure to initiate this process could unravel the inclusive government, prevent a smooth transition to the post-Mugabe era and raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying instability that would affect the whole region. A dozen or so securocrats senior military and intelligence figures are widely considered to hold de facto veto power over any real transition.

A cabal of powerful generals, with the support of elements in Zanu (PF), still believes that Tsvangirai should not be permitted to lead the country, even if he wins an election. The MDC-T leadership has raised this implicit threat with SADC leaders.

The issue is so sensitive that it was not addressed in the Mbeki-led GPA negotiations, but it has become a key agenda item for the new mediation team appointed by Jacob Zuma, his successor as South African president.

Moreover, even if the inclusive government completes the GPA, achieves a new democratic constitution and addresses the electoral process, the transition will not be assured unless a broader challenge is met, namely development of the political system to ensure that Zanu (PF) and the MDC-T balance political competition with cooperation in governance.

This will be particularly difficult as long as the divisive Mugabe is at the helm. At the December 2009 Zanu (PF) congress, he retained his party presidency unchallenged for an additional five-year term, thus positioning himself to contest another national election.

The securocrat problem

After almost a year in the inclusive government, senior MDC-T officials told Crisis Group that they believe the greatest threat to the power-sharing coalition and to the countrys stability will come from leaders of the national security services who are refusing to accept the new dispensation.

One said: We can implement the GPA to the last line, but if we dont deal with the contentious issue of the security leadership in this country, we will be haunted by it at the next elections. We will have a Madagascar-like situation if the military is left with free rein to dictate and influence key decisions with regards to political developments in the country, including national leadership.

In private discussions in South Africa, Tsvangirai and other senior MDC-T officials highlighted the issue of phased security sector reform as his principal concern in the run-up to new elections.

Most observers believe that up to 20 high-ranking security officials (the securocrats) maintain a de facto veto over the transition process. Among those frequently cited as hardliners are defence forces commander General Constantine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner General Augustine Chihuri and Central Intelligence Organisation Deputy Director General Maynard Muzariri.

In hushed conversations, MDC-T officials and civil society activists express fears that a coup could come shortly after an MDC-T electoral victory or should Mugabe die in office. Mugabe has fully backed the military leadership, his last remaining line of loyal support given his fractious party, in part by ruling out attempts to carry out a security reform programme.

Security sector reforms

He left no doubts about this symbiotic relationship in his closing remarks to the Zanu (PF) congress on 19 December 2009: Zanu (PF) as the party of the revolution and the peoples vanguard shall not allow the security forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any negotiations for the so-called security sector reforms . . . That is the most dependable force we could ever have, it shall not be tampered with.

The issue of the military command was not specifically addressed in the GPA negotiations. Still, the parties agreed to establish a new coordinating body for defence and security policy, the National Security Council (NSC), that would include Tsvangirai and his two deputy prime ministers and replace the Zanu (PF)-dominated, secretive and abusive Joint Operations Command (JOC).

Over the past decade, the JOC has been behind the strategy of repression to keep Mugabe and Zanu (PF) in power. It is the instrument through which Mugabe has masterminded the rigging of elections and the continuing wave of violent farm seizures.

The fact that the NSC has met only once in the past year while the supposedly defunct JOC holds numerous weekly sessions with no MDC-T participation is deeply worrying. Most recently, the JOC was reportedly behind the January decision by the Zanu (PF) politburo to make no further concessions to implement the GPA until sanctions are lifted.

A number of generals are now contemplating moving into full-time politics in Zanu (PF), including Chiwenga, who is eyeing a leadership position in the partys campaign in the new elections. This pattern underlines their determination to remain at the centre of national political and economic life

Fear of prosecution

The motives driving the senior security leaders to undermine the transition process and the inclusive government are diverse. In the past, they have reportedly benefited from packages administered by Reserve Bank Governor Gono through so-called quasi-fiscal measures, as well as largesse channelled through Mugabes wife, Grace, and Chiwenga.

A number of generals have reportedly built up substantial landholdings, either personally or through family members and other proxies, as a result of farm seizures ostensibly designed to assist the rural poor.

Their desire to protect these holdings is a key reason Zanu (PF) is opposing implementation of the GPA requirement to conduct a comprehensive land audit, since that exercise would expose these ownership patterns.

Mugabe is reportedly still sustaining the livelihoods and patronage network of a small group of generals, mainly through proceeds from the controversial private sale of diamonds being mined in abusive conditions from the Marange fields in eastern Zimbabwe and through loans extended to the military by the Chinese government.

Some senior security officials fear prosecution for gross human rights abuses committed in recent repression campaigns, especially those associated with the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as decades-old abuses, such as the killing of over 20,000 mainly Ndebele-speaking people in Matebeleland in the 1980s in a campaign known as Gukurahundi.

Amnesties have been granted frequently in the post-independence period, including in 1980, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995 and 2000. The amnesty provision in 1990 provided a full pardon for security force members for any offense committed during anti-dissident operations if that offence was committed in good faith for the purpose of or in connection with the restoration or maintenance of good order and public safety in Zimbabwe.

Still, a number of senior security officials have quietly expressed concerns that such amnesties could be revoked under an MDC-controlled government and legislature and that these provisions do not afford protection from international prosecution.

Praetorian Guard

Others generals are motivated by a continuing sense of ideological fervour, viewing their acts of repression against dissidents and white farmers over the past three decades as simply a continuation of the liberation struggle of the pre-independence period. In the extreme, they believe that Tsvangirai and the MDC-T are mere puppets for white farmers and business interests, as well as foreign interests, especially British.

They see themselves as the bulwark and Praetorian Guard of the revolutionary struggle, and thus handing over power to Tsvangirai, who has no liberation war record, would amount to selling out.

One implication of this attitude is that these security officials would be loath to appear before anything resembling a truth and reconciliation commission and acknowledge their abuses, since they believe that their acts were not crimes but heroic feats to protect Zimbabwe from its enemies.

Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are increasingly debating the question of how to secure the retirement of these security officials during the life of the inclusive government. Many are highly reluctant to consider any concessions to the officials, viewing them as rewards for past abuses and undercutting rule of law in a future Zimbabwe.

While even these individuals see the threat from the generals, they also believe that the threat can be minimised by playing on the growing divisions between senior security officials and the rank-and-file military and police, who have themselves suffered under the economic implosion brought about by Mugabe and his cronies.

Further, they doubt that concessions would have the desired effect, given the varied motivations of the generals and their scepticism regarding the permanence and utility of past amnesties.

Some suggest that security sector reform, leading to higher salaries, improved housing and educational benefits and a greater sense of pride in a professional security service, would better undercut the capacity of senior officers to use troops against a democratically-elected government.

Expanded international pressure on Mugabe and Zanu (PF) to ensure the full functioning of the National Security Council, truly disband the Joint Operations Centre and proceed with the land audit to settle issues of ownership and compensation, if necessary, would go a long way toward diminishing the threat of the security officials.

Soft landings

At the same time, a number of MDC-T and MDC-M officials and human rights activists, including some who have suffered the worst of the abuses, have raised the possibility of arranging soft landings for the securocrats.

Persuading them to retire peacefully will not be easy, given their fears of the post-Mugabe era. Among the ideas being discussed is a new domestic amnesty for acts committed since the last amnesty in 2000, in exchange for the retirement of the officials, but revocable should they be found to be engaging in actions to thwart the transition to democratic governance.

In keeping with past Zimbabwean practice, such an amnesty would not apply to so-called specified offences, such as murder, rape and theft of public property, nor would it protect the officials from international prosecution for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

Another idea being discussed is to allow the generals to keep their assets, including perhaps even their farmlands, by arranging legal transfer to them as retirement compensation, but also providing compensation to those illegally dispossessed. The US, EU and others could sweeten the deal by removing targeted sanctions on those who comply with its terms, since they would no longer be thwarting the transition.

It is unclear whether these measures, even in combination, would be sufficient to remove the threat posed by many of the incumbent leaders of the security forces. Having always associated the exercise of power with the use of force, they may never be satisfied that their economic interest and personal security could be adequately protected after they surrender their power.

Conclusion

Zimbabwe remains at risk from the long legacy of misgovernment that produced the interlocking political, economic and humanitarian crises of the past decade. In addition to the challenges of governance and security highlighted in this briefing, any of a wide range of problems, singly or in common, could return it to the edge of collapse, particularly as long as Robert Mugabe remains head of state and his long-time ruling Zanu (PF) party maintains its intransigent stance.

The reformist MDC, split into sharply opposed factions, has performed reasonably in government, but has not seized the impetus for reform that seemed possible after it gained a parliamentary majority in 2008.

But despite its internal contradictions, the widely divergent ambitions of its three participating parties and the reluctance of donors to fully embrace it, the unity government has important achievements to its credit.

The economy has gained a degree of stability, arbitrary political violence has been reduced, and a dialogue continues, with South African mediation, on the major political, constitutional and electoral issues.

Even a bitterly divided Zanu (PF) implicitly acknowledges the need for a generational change, and at least one of its two main contenders for Mugabes mantle is well into exploration of ways to come to terms with the main MDC wing and the transition process.

South Africas role remains vital, especially now that Jacob Zuma is bringing to it a more even-handed and energetic quality of engagement.

Western governments need to offer complementary financial as well as political assistance, including the maintenance of targeted sanctions on the spoilers and the selective removal of corporate sanctions that stand in the way of economic growth.

Above all, Zimbabweans themselves both the parties in the inclusive government and broader civil society must put the legacy of divide-and-rule politics behind them and learn basic lessons of cooperation essential for a successful democratic transition. –– International Crisis Group, March 2010