Are targeted sanctions smart enough?

Article 4 of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) stipulates, among other things, that “the parties hereby agree () that all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe”. It also notes a commitment to work together “in re-engaging the international community with a view to bringing to an end the country’s international isolation”.

It was evident from the onset that sanctions would be one of the most contentious issues in Zimbabwe’s “mariage trois”. Zanu (PF) has, on occasion, blamed the MDC-T for not doing enough to lobby for the removal of sanctions. The MDC-T, on the other hand, insists that the responsibility for these sanctions rests squarely upon Zanu (PF), whose continued refusal to act in a democratic and accountable manner is to blame for the persistence of the sanctions regime.

Governments, such as those of the USA and UK, have made it clear that they would consider lifting the restrictive measures only once there is visible evidence of reform on the ground. The UK government was quick to dissociate itself from Foreign Secretary David Milliband’s recent statement that its position on sanctions would be largely driven by the MDC’s directive, stating that they would consult with a number of stakeholders, including the MDC, on the economic and social conditions in Zimbabwe. Since then, the positions on both sides appear to be hardening once more, with Zanu (PF) adamant that it would make no concessions in the recent talks to solve the political impasse unless the issue of sanctions was resolved and all targeted measures lifted.

But before dismissing calls for the lifting of sanctions as biased or premature, or simply refusing to consider lifting any restrictive measures, one should first ask whether these measures have achieved the goal they initially set out to attain, and second, whether the targeted sanctions in place are still relevant given the changed political environment.

This Situation Report attempts to elucidate the contested matter of sanctions in Zimbabwe by outlining all the “sanctions and measures” mentioned in the GPA currently in place. Who do they target, how rigorously are they implemented, and are all restrictive measures still in effect? Also, is there perhaps a middle ground to be found between the two extremes of unconditionally lifting all restrictive measures as called for by some and the other extreme of maintaining all targeted sanctions until every outstanding issue surrounding the GPA is resolved?

Limitations

In case of Zimbabwe, it appears that the effectiveness of smart sanctions has been limited by inconsistencies in their implementation as well as by their selective nature. Although a travel ban may have had an initial impact in the sense that it limited the free movement of a targeted individual, it appears that the impact was not severe enough to compel such persons to change their behaviour. Underscoring this dilemma is the fact that the travel restrictions apply only to certain countries and allow travel exemptions for participation in meetings co-ordinated by international organisations, for example. Targeted individuals can therefore easily find ways to circumvent the ban – either by travelling to and shopping in countries that have not imposed such restrictions, or by attending international conferences or humanitarian events while at the same time pursuing their interests in which ever countries they visit.

There is also lack of clarity on the exact limitations of the EU travel ban, which in the past has also been ignored. Targeted individuals have not always been restricted in their movements, and thus there was less pressure on them to change their behaviour in order to have restrictions lifted.

By describing the sanctions as illegal, Mugabe has used the sanctions as a scapegoat. He has not spared any opportunity to denounce the targeted sanctions as serving the cause of the imperialists and colonialists, portraying himself as a hero of the masses. In doing so, he has transformed the external pressure into political capital in support of his alleged anti-imperialist cause, discrediting anyone in favour of sanctions as puppets of the West.

Business as usual

Even after it had imposed sanctions, the EU, for example, remained second in importance only to neighbouring South Africa as a trade partner to Zimbabwe.

What has in actual fact led to Zanu (PF) agreeing to enter into a power sharing arrangement with the opposition MDC? It appears that there may have been more a pragmatic reason for this development, namely the continuing downward spiral of the economy, that is, the fact that the economic situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the political elite could no longer sustain the status quo.

If the imposition of sanctions alone has been less effective in fostering democracy or compelling the ruling elite to change their tactics or behaviour, then there is little empirical reason to maintain them. Given that these sanctions have now been instrumentalised by Zanu (PF) hardliners, one might even say that they are doing the MDC more harm than good by providing its opponents with a justification for stalling the ongoing negotiations around the full implementation of the GPA, targeted sanctions had missed the mark as several high-ranking and influential individuals from the former Mugabe hijacked the issue, using it as a scapegoat to explain the devastation of the country’s economy.

Thus while a lifting of all restrictive measures may be construed as a political victory for Zanu (PF), it could also be portrayed as a reward for achievements made following the MDC’s joining of the government. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has on occasion called for the easing of travel and financial restrictions as a reward for progress achieved thus far. Thurs a conditional lifting could just as well be interpreted as an achievement of the MDC.

Finding a middle ground

The key recommendation of this report would be to reconsider the position on targeted sanctions and seriously question whether they have achieved the goal intended, or whether they are likely to have the desired effect in the future. Will the targeted individuals be moved to change their behaviour, or will they continue to use this issue to divert attention from their responsibility for the economic downfall in the country?

The international community faces a dilemma, on the one hand, not all conditions have been met to justify the lifting of all restrictive measures, yet on other other hand, the issue has become a key public justification for Zanu PF to stall the GPA process.

Perhaps it would be prudent to consider showing a sign of good faith by removing certain restrictions to acknowledge that there have been improvements in the economy and a decrease in incidents of violent crackdown on opposition supporters. Moderates can be found on all parts of the political spectrum, not only within the MDC, but also within Zanu (PF) itself. Certain elites have indeed changed their behaviour and this could be an opportunity for the international community to send a positive signal. This would also have the added effect of deflating the argument by several targeted individuals that sanctions are harming the country as a whole, and would provide a channel for communication to the wider public (through the media) that sanctions are specific, and not comprehensive.

What has sustained the crisis is perhaps the lack of a strong, unified position on the issue of sanctions from all stakeholders and interested parties. As long as Mugabe has allies on certain issues, he will be hard-pressed to make any serious political concessions. Hence efforts should be undertaken to consolidate the message from international bodies. At the moment, SADC and its representatives are calling for a lifting of sanctions, yet the USA and other Western states are adamant that these be upheld until the full implementation of the GPA. These actors should perhaps realign their positions on this issue in order to increase pressure either way. There should be serious and visible consultations between Western states and SADC on the issue of sanctions -because whether we like it or not, their lifting may be as much part of the problem as it may be part of the solution. Editor’s note: Excerpt of a report compiled by Judy Smith-Hohn Institute for security studies