The papers author, Professor Richard Gibb, the Pro Vice-Chancellor at the University of Plymouth, in the UK, said aligning Zimbabwe with the most effectively functioning customs union in Africa offered great opportunities to promote cooperation, coordination and integration with South Africa.
But he described the ZimbabweSACU relationship as complex, dynamic and multi-layered, and concluded that now is not the time for Zimbabwe to join SACU. The following are excerpts from his paper: Zimbabwes integration with SACU, its major trading partner, could also lock-in domestic policy reform and, if accepted into SACU, add considerable legitimacy to
the Zimbabwe policy environment.
Aligning Zimbabwe with the most effectively functioning customs union in Africa offers great opportunities to promote cooperation, coordination and integration between South Africa, undoubtedly Africas most powerful economy, and Zimbabwe. It also has the potential to offer a rules-based and transparent governance structure to Zimbabwes
tariff and trade regime, and, albeit to a lesser extent, industrial policy.
Unreliable data
Although Zimbabwes trade data are notoriously unreliable and inconsistent, and should therefore be interpreted with caution, SACU accounts for approximately 70 and 45 per cent of all imports and exports, respectively. Equally, Zimbabwe is a significant export market for SACU.
Throughout the 1990s Zimbabwe was SACUs fifth most important export market, equal to Germany. Zimbabwes trade policy regime, either within or outside of SACU, will play an important part in that countrys reintegration into both the southern African and world markets. In short, Zimbabwes trade regime will help determine the future growth and development of the state.
SACU, established in 1910, is widely regarded to be the most effectively functioning regional trade agreement in Africa as well as the oldest customs union in the world. Zimbabwes extraordinary and extreme economic collapse has been well documented. In 2008, Zimbabwes unemployment rate was estimated to be around For the majority of its existence, SACU has been a profoundly undemocratic institution. Historically, it had little positive impact on good governance and democratisation in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Hence, following South Africas first democratic election, the democratisation of SACUs institutional infrastructure became a key priority.
Trade benefits
Article 2 of the 2002 Agreement sets out eight objectives for the new SACU, including a desire to create effective, transparent and democratic institutions that will ensure equitable trade benefits to Member States. The 2002 Agreement has profound implications for Zimbabwe. At the moment, Zimbabwe could join SACU as its sixth Member State, sharing sovereignty over tariff and SACU matters equally with South Africa and all other Member States. For the first time in SACUs long history, joining SACU does not necessarily mean ceding large elements of economic sovereignty to South Africa.
There are, however, serious reservations and disquiet about the 2002 SACU Agreement amongst the existing five Member States. In reality the institutional agreement proposed by the 2002 SACU Agreement has, thus far, not been implemented.
Not operational
By 2010, the all-important Tariff Board was not operational, with South Africas International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC), a South African national body, undertaking the functions of the SACU Tariff Board. Furthermore, only
South Africa had an established National Body (the ITAC) making the operation of the proposed SACU Tariff Board problematic.
The fact that three SACU institutions have not yet been established, several years after the 2002 Agreement was signed, reflects and raises concerns over the democratic nature, credibility and effectiveness of the 2002 SACU Agreement.
There is widespread disquiet in South Africa, throughout business, government and the third sector, concerning the democratic credibility, efficacy and practicality of implementing the framework proposed by the 2002 Agreement. Is it democratic for South Africa, with approximately 90 per cent of SACUs population and GDP, to share power equally with Swaziland, with just 2 per cent of SACUs population, or Lesotho, with 0.5 per cent of GDP. Some form of renegotiated
democratic institutional framework is already high on the agenda.
Poor governance
On the issue of Zimbabwes catastrophic record of poor governance, it is unlikely that SACU membership alone could fundamentally redress or address this problem. However, the example of EU expansion may be of relevance.
Once the states of east-central European decided to embark on economic and political reform, EU membership provided political legitimacy, policy credibility and stability, so-called lock-in, to the reform process, both domestically and internationally. A similar positive outcome could emerge if Zimbabwe, having chosen to reform its economic and political governance, then chose to join SACU.
It is very unlikely that this process could operate in reverse, with Zimbabwe first joining SACU and then deciding to pursue national reform. The dangers to the existing Member States of SACU, as well as to the neo-patrimonial state-structure represented by Zanu (PF) patronage, means that it would not be in the interests of either SACU nor Zimbabwe, as currently configured, to join SACU.
Post published in: Opinions