Last Steps Toward A New Constitution – 4

Chapter 7 of the version of the COPAC draft that reached me says election results must be announced “as soon as possible after the close of polls”. That might be sufficient elsewhere, but here it is not good enough. We remember that in 2008 “as soon as it was possible” to rig the results with any chance of fooling anybody (even Thabo Mbeki) meant we had to wait six weeks.

That was when the Electoral Act said that votes were to be counted at polling stations, in public, and results were to be posted outside each polling station, so anybody who was alert enough could read the results, share them with voters in other areas and we could all, with a little effort and a pocket calculator, check the whole process for ourselves. We know that anyone who tried that very quickly ran into trouble with the mutinous police and army and other forces who had publicly announced, before the election, that the only result they would accept was a Zanu (PF) victory.

The undemocratic forces don’t all wear uniforms. After making good instructions on delineating constituency boundaries so as to give each constituency approximately equal numbers of voters, and giving parliament the power to examine the proposed boundaries, the draft, in clause 7.7 (9), only says that parliament may give the electoral commission their judgement, the commission must consider it, but the final decision lies with the commission. Can we trust the Electoral Commission?

Much depends on whether we go into an election with the present compromised commission or a new one appointed according to the Copac draft. That does at least provide that the long-serving members of the present commission can sit there no longer.

Many people will find it difficult to trust “independent commissions” appointed by the present incumbent of State House, even if his power is limited to selecting eight from a list of 12 names presented by the parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders and appointing a chairperson on advice of both this committee and the Judicial Services Commission.

The draft only states: “12.7 (3) If the appointment of a chairperson to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is not consistent with a recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, the President must cause the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders to be informed as soon as practicable.” But it does not say who should act to resolve the issue.

The draft also says the various commissions are to be independent but are accountable to parliament. This might be good enough for the other commissions, but how could the Electoral Commission be accountable to parliament if they were involved in rigging another election as the last one was rigged?

Who watches over our watchdogs when they influence the composition of the parliament they report to? It is difficult to say who else but parliament should do that. Is insisting that the whole electoral process should be transparent and free from outside influences the best we can do? The draft does that.

The draft does say that the defence forces, police and intelligence services should be apolitical; their leaders must not be members of any political party or serve the interests of any political party. On paper that looks great. But can it work with the present structures and commanders of those services? If that’s a problem, it doesn’t mean we should reject this draft. It does mean we should all be extra vigilant and prepared for any dirty tricks that might be played. If we can’t change the military and police commanders and rein in the CIO, we may have to demand that someone else’s army and police keep order during our next election.

Nobody will rush to volunteer for that task. But we might be able to persuade South Africa and/or SADC that pressing for removal of antidemocratic commanders from our security forces before an election would make supervising the election cheaper.

Post published in: Opinions & Analysis

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