 The situation in Zimbabwe exemplifies the case where action (the repression and authoritarianism of the state) is not, or cannot, be met with an equal but opposite reaction.
I am not saying there is no opposition to the despotism of Zanu (PF) and Robert Mugabe. Opposition does exist but it is not equal to the repressive capacity of the Zimbabwean state. As Mugabe prepares to run off into a new era of tyranny, there is a need to examine the reasons for the imbalance of forces between Zanu (PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Such an examination should help us to understand the options available.
The balance is, on the one hand, characterised by the fact that Zanu (PF) has firm control over the levers of state power but, on the other, by what seems to be growing popular support for the MDC and its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. If the results of the March 29 election are anything to go by, Mugabe failed to erode the urban support base of the MDC, while the opposition seems to have managed to make some gains in Zanu (PF)’s rural stronghold. If there is a stalemate in Zimbabwe, it must be characterised in terms of the balance between state’s capacity for repression and popular support for the opposition.
Those of us who argue that there is no stalemate between Zanu (PF) and the MDC do so on the basis of the imbalance between the repressive capacity of the Zimbabwean state and internal resistance. We do so also on the basis of the imbalance between external pressure and the capacity of the Zimbabwean state for authoritarianism.
THIS is complicated by the fact that elements of the left are mediating the Zimbabwean crisis through narrow and paranoid conceptions of threats posed by imperialist agendas. There is no doubt that imperialist forces are almost always a factor, but the people of Zimbabwe are faced with a repressive regime hiding behind the false consciousness of a pseudo anti-imperialist discourse. In this climate, it is difficult to conceive of anything but more repression in Zimbabwe. Zanu (PF) are certainly going to turn the screws on the MDC. The space for effective opposition will undoubtedly close down even further, making it difficult for MDC leaders to mobilise support for democratic change.
Given these complexities, what should external actors and the opposition do?
The MDC needs to adopt a strategy that combines international pressure with increasing levels of internal resistance. Such a strategy will inevitably increase the appetite of the state for the blood of ordinary Zimbabweans. The MDC must anticipate this and split its leadership between those who must continue operating internally and a layer of leadership mobilising support outside Zimbabwe. This may necessitate the formation of a government in exile whose moral authority is based on the outcome of the March elections.
In addition, multilateral bodies such as the African Union, the Southern African Development Community and the United Nations must be pressured into isolating the Zimbabwean government. This may take the form of suspending it pending a democratic resolution of the crisis. If leaders of the African continent argue that this will rob these institutions of opportunities for constructive engagement, we must tell them to stop lying  constructive engagement can occur by other means.
And what about the idea of a government of national unity? My concern is that Africa may be entering a period of despocracy. Despocracy means that dictators can avoid the implications of electoral defeat by imposing a climate of violence which leads to the installation of a government of national unity. Any such government must, therefore, be just an interim measure.
Matshiqi is a senior associate political analyst at the Centre for Policy Studies.
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