Africa Confidential Vol 50 – N 15 _3

In a hopeful State of the Nation address in June, Zuma promised his government would create half a million jobs in his first year in office, violent crime would be cut by 7-10%, 80% of those who needed anti-retrovirals would get them by 2011, and everyone would get a holiday on Mandela Day every 18 July.With an annual 21.6% fall in manufacturing and mining companies laying off workers, the job creation promise looks especially far-fetched. Although union leaders celebrated the comradely Zumas accession to power, the grassroots membership demur. Zuma now faces a more formidable wave of strikes than anything under Thabo Mbekis presidency: gold, plantinum and coal miners are threatening action; paper and chemical workers started strikes this week; and rail workers and workers at the state broadcaster also speak of disruption. Protesters lambasted corruption within the ANC and government mismanagement as a direct cause of poor services and the downturn. Just three months after Zumas victory, the ANCs core supporters are unconvinced by his response to growing hardship. His impressive economic team have their work cut out.

The Kenyan government has until the end of September to set up an independent special tribunal on the post-election violence of December 2007. On 9 July, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague an envelope listing alleged perpetrators of the violence that followed the 2007 elections. The list was compiled by Justice Philip Wakis Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) and handed to Annan last year. His July action pre-empted an earlier agreement with the government, giving it an extension until the end of August to set up a special tribunal. The Waki Commission had intended this tribunal to be independent from Kenyas judicial system, with international and local judges and investigators. Annan had become involved in Kenyas reckoning in January 2008 as the African Unions (AU) mediator. Two months later, President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga signed an agreement which included setting up the CIPEV. In mid-October 2008 in Nairobi, Justice Waki handed over the CIPEVs report and a secret envelope containing a list of high-level perpetrators to Annan for safekeeping. Annan gave up waiting for the government to take action after a delegation of Kenyan politicians visited him in Geneva, took a tour of the ICC in The Hague and met the Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo. The team was led by Minister of Justice Mutula Kilonzo (President Daniel arap Mois former lawyer), with much-criticised Attorney General, Amos Wako; Minister of Lands James Orengo; Assistant Minister of Justice William Cheptuno; and three other officials. The delegation had been seeking more time and suggested that the accused should be tried not by a special tribunal but by a specially constituted section of Kenyas own High Court. That would not require a constitutional amendment, unlike the special tribunal, but the courts independence would be questioned. During the months before he went to Geneva, Justice Minister Kilonzo had been pressing for more time and consideration of Kenyas special circumstances.

Kenyans want a trial in the hagueKilonzo argued that a tribunal would divide Kenya and that the government did not have the necessary funds. He made plans in June for Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat, a former diplomat and civil servant from the Rift Valley, to organise a conference in July to get feedback about a special tribunal, all of which caused further delays; Kiplagat has been suggested as head of a truth and reconciliation commission. The recent budget from the Minister of Finance, Uhuru Kenyatta, provided no money for witness protection (AC Vol 50 No 12). All this helps explain why 53% of those surveyed in May by the South Consulting Group (which was originally contracted by donors to inform and educate Kenyan voters before the elections) wanted a trial in The Hague, with only 33% supporting a special tribunal. A poll by Steadman shows 68% supporting a trial in The Hague, with 13% favouring a local trial.To safeguard himself against spin by the Kenyan politicians, Ocampo asked them to agree and sign minutes of their meeting on 3 July, which are posted on the ICCs website. They show that the Kenyan government has until the end of September to provide the following: a report on the status of the investigation and prosecutions and any other information requested by the ICC prosecutor; information of measures put in place to ensure the safety of victims and witnesses; and information on the modalities for conducting national investigations and prosecutions of those responsible for the 2007 [post-election] violence through a special tribunal or other judicial mechanism adopted by the Kenyan parliament, with clear benchmarks over the next 12 months. The government has committed itself to ending the impunity of those responsible for the most serious crimes and is bound to refer such cases to the ICC under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, should parliament fail to approve the establishment of a special tribunal. Wilfred Nderitu, head of the Kenyan chapter of the International Commission of Jurists, thinks that this means that if the ICC receives no assurances from the government of a special tribunal by the end of September, Ocampo will take over.The ICC, which has been looking at the Kenya situation since 5 February 2008, is empowered to begin a formal investigation as a court of last resort only if Kenya fails to meet its commitments. Yet Kenya could nominally comply while carrying on as usual and procrastinate for up to another year until June 2010 or undermine any court that is set up, particularly if it is an alternative mechanism such as a special section of the High Court. That means the cases would be heard in the run-up to the 2012 elections, risking more chaos. Kenyas wily politicians might then take the opportunity to ask for another extension.Ocampo explained that if Kenya did not meet its deadlines or if the court did not conform to international standards, the ICC would then take over and decide whether to take the case up. The recommendations of the Waki Commission also state the ICC should take over the case if a special tribunal is set up, but the process has been subverted (see Box). Leaks to the local press from the closed-door meeting between the Kenyan team and Ocampo speak of charged exchanges. Ocampo should expect more subterfuge from the politicians.

no justice, no faithJust after Ocampos meeting with the Kenyan officials, Annan announced that he was handing over the Waki Commissions list to The Hague, saying justice delayed is justice denied. This move short-circuited the attempts of those politicians who have little interest in establishing a special tribunal or in prosecuting anyone but their adversaries to delay any resolution by proposing an alternative judicial mechanism instead of the special tribunal.On 1 July, Annan told the AU that their outcry against justice demeans the yearning for human dignity that resides in every African heart, and represents a step backward in the battle against impunity. We hear that before he announced that he was passing the Waki envelope to Ocampo, Annan had six boxes of supporting material air-freighted out of Kenya. After that, Kenyas government faces huge pressure to get the special tribunal set up before September. Pictures in the Nairobi Daily Nation of Liberias ex-President Charles Taylor defending himself against war-crimes charges in The Hague are a sharp reminder to those who masterminded the 2007 post-election violence. The Waki Commissions envelope and the boxes of supporting material reached the ICC on 16 July. Ocampo already has opened the envelope and is keeping the contents secret in a vault.The Chief Prosecutor will decide what to do next if the Kenyans have done nothing by September. Beatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, the ICCs Director of Jurisdiction, Complimentarity and Cooperation, has been analysing information on Kenya, with a recently increased team of 14. She said in April that if the ICC decided to act, it would do so relentlessly and immediately. Diplomats from Western countries, including the United States, which is not a signatory to the ICC, have backed Annans handover although they say a special tribunal within Kenya would still be the best option.On 16 July the European Unions representative in Kenya, Anna Brandt, backed calls for a special tribunal. She said that Western donors will cut off aid to Kenya and help the ICC if Kenya does not take action. It is not known if this statement was coordinated with those of Annan or Ocampo. A week earlier, Brandt had signed a five-year 17.5 billion Kenyan shilling (US$22.9 million) Swedish aid agreement: those and other commitments are now under threat.On 14 July, the Kenyan cabinet met to consider the two draft laws, wrangled for four hours but failed to reach a consensus. The same thing happened again on 20 July, with continued splits along the party and factional lines that had divided parliament in February. Some MPs oppose any prosecutions for the election violence. Having voted against the special tribunal bill in February, when they said they favoured the ICC, they now say they want a truth and reconciliation commission. This group includes a block of politicians from the Rift Valley: William Ntimama (listed in the Akilano Akiwumi report on ethnic clashes in the 1990s as a person who should be investigated further), Najib Balala, Franklin Bett and Charles Keter in the cabinet, Benjamin Langat, Zakayo Cheruiyot and Julius Kones, in parliament. They have recently been joined by the Orange Democratic Movements (ODM) Minister of Agriculture, William Ruto, who had earlier disagreed with Odinga and favoured referral to the ICC when there was little prospect of a Hague trial. He said he feared the Kibaki government would be biased against politicians from the Rift, where most of the violence occurred. Like other MPs from various parts of the country, he seems to have thought that the ICC would not do anything until well after the 2012 election. Ruto (who was recently made a Sabaot elder in conflict-ridden Mount Elgon) argues that establishing a special tribunal would precipitate more violence. He is against any legal proceedings on the post-election events which, he says, stemmed from the disputed 2007 election. Ruto wants the poll-riggers charged, but Ocampo has made it clear that the ICC is not a political but a criminal court. Most MPs have vowed to vote against a special tribunal, suspicious that it will be manipulated. Among the most outspoken voices is Gitobu Imanyara, an MP and human rights activist, who wanted Annan to hand over the Waki envelope in January. Among Central Province politicians Imanyara and Safina party leader Paul Muite have claimed that they face threats for their stand against a local tribunal. In May, a report by South Consulting claimed that 60 witnesses already have left Kenya in fear for their lives; the UNs Special Prosecutor, Philip Alston, said the same of witnesses who spoke to him. Others who voted against the special tribunal in February might do so again. The first law anchoring the tribunal in the constitution requires a two-thirds majority; the second setting up the special tribunal needs only a simple majority and thus could easily be used to water down the second law after the first was passed. Many MPs fear that this might allow the President or the Attorney General to dismiss judges, grant amnesties, end cases or otherwise interfere. Some of those against a special tribunal do not want it because they fear justice might be done, others because they fear it will not. Those who do support a tribunal include those who believe it is desirable and possible, those who do not want to see Kenya labelled as a failed state, those who want to see more rather than fewer perpetrators tried, some lawyers who would prefer judicial proceedings to be on their turf and in full public view and some who fear that the ICC might not take up the case. The ICC could decide that the case does not qualify in terms of the number or duration of the killings; that it does not have evidence of deeds amounting to crimes against humanity as defined; or the evidence might not sustain an indictment. In an interview published on 10 July by The Standard newspaper, Ocampo said that the crimes were probably crimes against humanity, and if necessary he would reach an impartial conclusion about whether or not to investigate the individuals named in the Waki envelope, while also considering other evidence. Some supporters of President Kibakis Party of National Unity, including Justice Minister Kilonzo, want a trial by a separate unit set up within the High Court, rather than by a special tribunal. Given the wide disrepute in which the judiciary, seen as malleable and subject to political manipulation, is held, many Kenyans would not support any connection to the High Court. Some lawyers say that if the tribunal became a division of the High Court, the Attorney General could terminate cases. PNU ministers Kiraitu Murungi, Moses Wetangula, John Michuki and George Saitoti were said to be against the amended laws necessary to establish a tribunal, presented by Kilonzo to the cabinet on 14 July. They would not support clauses stripping President Kibaki of his immunity from prosecution or other measures designed to preclude executive interference in any tribunal.Martha Karua, who resigned this year as Minister of Justice, does not consider that either Kibaki or Odinga have the political will to set up a local tribunal. Odinga, who draws support from the areas worst affected by the post-election violence, appears isolated because of his support for a local tribunal. Some MPs believe that criminal convictions would eliminate their political opponents. The PNU has said that any of its members who are charged will be on their own, perhaps a sign of other partings of the way to come. Already the ODM is split between Prime Minister Odinga and William Ruto, who claims that Odinga has abandoned his Rift Valley base. Meanwhile, there are other veiled hints of a new KK (Kikuyu-Kalenjin) alliance between Ruto and Finance Minister Kenyatta in anticipation of the 2012 election. This speculation might be wishful thinking by all. Even if against expectation parliament approves a bill to set up the tribunal, the government may still decide to ignore or undermine it. Now, with the Waki envelope safely in The Hague, the ICC could take up the case even before the June 2010 deadline set by Ocampo for the government to reach its one-year benchmarks. The increasing uncertainty about how Kenyas post-election violence will be addressed comes amidst a lack of leadership, an upsurge in criminal and gang violence and increasing ethnic polarisation and corruption. It leaves an irate public fearful of the future. Leaflets warning of future violence are circulating in the Rift Valley, while the criminal Mungiki gangs are said to be rearming their supporters. Without a resolution of the legal and political crisis, politicians are preparing for a worsening confrontation in the run-up to the 2012 elections. l

Options narrow after the ICC receives the list of suspects

Liberia_6

kenya_2

nigeria_4

gambia _5

liberia politics_7

liberia tribunals_8

congo-kinshasa_9

whos who_11

pointers_12

Taylor gets his day in Court

the implications of taylors trial in the hague will be felt across africa.

Fifteen years of one-man rule

The regime gets away with human rights abuses but gets along with neighbours.

Politicians face new deadline

kofi annan has sent the envelope to the icc and now kibaki and odinga must act decisively.

Amnesty not honesty

the n50 bn. amnesty offers respite but will not change the corruption and environmental despoliation.

AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL

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kenyan politicians face new deadlineKofi Annan, the former United Nations Secretary General, made his announcement about handing over the envelope containing the list of the accused to the International Criminal Court just six days after meeting a Kenyan government delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, on 3 July. For months, he had repeated that if the August deadline was not met he would give the envelope to the ICC, thus complying with the recommendations by Judge Philip Wakis Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence on what should happen if the government could not or would not establish a special tribunal. The handover came amidst continued Kenyan government and parliamentary dithering, attempts to buy time, and plans to undermine the letter and spirit of Wakis recommendations. Alternatives proposed in July by the Kenyan delegation were to have perpetrators tried in a special section of Kenyas High Court, or instead to set up a truth and reconciliation commission that might allow for amnesty. James Orengo, the Minister of Lands, accused Annan of ambushing the Kenyan authorities, and then retracted that claim. Setting up a special tribunal would require two decisive votes in parliament. The first would amend the constitution and allow such a tribunal to exist independently from the judiciary and the laws governing it; the second would set up the tribunal itself. The Waki Commission recommended that this process be completed promptly. It handed over its report to the government in mid-October 2008. The first deadline, met at the eleventh hour on 16 December, was for the heads of the parties in the ruling coalition, President Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement, to agree to set up the special tribunal within 60 days of receipt of the Commissions report. The second deadline was for parliament to pass the two necessary laws within 45 days and then to have another month to set up the special tribunal by 1 May. It was missed. The first law, requiring a two-thirds parliamentary majority to anchor the tribunal in the constitution, was shot down on 12 February, two weeks after Wakis 30 January deadline. The government mustered only 101 of the 148 votes needed, after parliament had taken a short recess and been summoned back to deal with the legislation. If the law had passed, the government would have had 30 more days to set up the tribunal. Annan had already extended the Waki deadline and granted two further extensions, one for two months, which was not met partly because parliament was prorogued on 27 February, and another on 4 April until the end of August. Both misses were the result of deliberate procrastinations by most, a fear of political interference if the process were local by others, and a desire to sidestep justice by many. l

the cipeVs recommendationsRecommendations from the Waki Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), Part V, Chapter 13.If either an agreement for the establishment of the Special Tribunal is not signed, or the Statute for the Special Tribunal fails to be enacted, or the Special Tribunal fails to commence functioning as contemplated above, or having commenced operating its purposes are subverted, a list containing the names of and relevant information on those suspected to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the proposed Special Tribunal shall be forwarded to the Special Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The Special Prosecutor shall be requested to analyze the seriousness of the information received with a view to proceeding with an investigation and prosecuting such suspected persons.The Bill establishing the Special Tribunal shall ensure that the Special Tribunal is insulated against objections on constitutionality and to that end, it shall be anchored in the Constitution of Kenya. l

Nigeria

Amnesty not honesty

The N50 bn. amnesty deal offers a respite but will not change the corruption and environmental despoliation that fire the conflict in the Niger Delta

The Niger Delta militants take an unorthodox approach to public relations. In the morning of 12 July they launched Operation Moses, detonating a bomb which devastated part of the Atlas Cove jetty in Lagos, killing five people. It was the first major operation the militants had launched outside the Delta and preceded their announcement of a 60-day ceasefire with the government. Also it showed the militants capacity to strike key economic targets at will and do further damage to the chaotic fuel distribution network. The attack on Lagos coincided with the governments release of Henry Okah, a leading figure in the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, who had been on trial facing charges of gun-running and treason, following his arrest in Angola in September 2007.It seems MEND intends to combine negotiations with the Federal Government, via a delegation led by Timi Alaibe, with demonstrations of its ability to attack the oil and gas industry. Its attacks have pushed down Nigerias average production to under 1.8 million barrels a day (b/d), and some officials from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation say production has at times fallen below 1 mn. b/d.This encouraged President Umaru Musa YarAduas government to offer an amnesty to the militants which might cost some N50 bn. (US$332 mn.), but it would be cheap in comparison to the billions of dollars of revenue Abuja is losing from shrinking oil exports. Referring to United States President Barack Obamas calls in Accra, Ghana for more democracy and accountability, MENDs ubiquitous spokesman, Jomo Gbomo, justified the Lagos attack in an email to journalists: Because our fight is happening in a country with a fraudulent electoral process and corrupt leadership, we feel vindicated.The Federal Government pursues its own two-track policy: it offers an amnesty to the militants but closely guards the secrecy of its military operations in Gbaramatu, the traditional seat of Ijaw power that extends across the Delta.Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians have died in repeated clashes between the militarys Joint Task Force (JTF) and militants near Chevrons Escravos terminal, which has created a refugee crisis in Warri, the Delta state capital. Precise figures are hard to get: journalists are effectively barred from the conflict zone around Gbaramatu in the western Delta, and even the international Red Cross struggles to get access. Okahs release on 12 July followed an appearance by Attorney General Michael Aondoakaa before Justice Mohammed Liman in the High Court in Jos to enter a nolle prosequi on behalf of the Federal Government. Outside the courtroom, Okah asked Do I look like a militant? and claimed he had been unfairly targeted by the government. Yet MEND has made his presence a pre-condition for talks between Alaibes delegation and YarAduas Presidency. Aondoakaa said: The accused person has agreed to work with the Federal Government and he is now a free man.Both seem to accept the states amnesty and militants ceasefire as part of a useful quid pro quo without high expectations that it will prove any more successful than previous deals. The amnesty excludes the main target of the JTFs operations in Gbaramatu: the MEND commander in the western Delta, High Chief Government Ekpemupolo (alias Tompolo).Tompolo remains at large despite the helicopters, warships and thousands of JTF troops being deployed to frustrate his networks. Neither have the JTF been able to locate his main arms caches, financed from piracy and oil bunkering. Locals speak of German intermediaries helping to organise oil and weapons swaps.President YarAdua might make more progress with some of the militant leaders in the eastern Delta: notably, Soboma George and Ateke Tom, who have been offered amnesty. Tom was armed by the government of Rivers State under Governor Peter Odili to help rig elections for the ruling Peoples Democratic Party in 2003. Those links between corrupt politicians and oil sector militancy have flourished over the past five years.Former State Security Service Director Chief Alfred Horsfall is overseeing the amnesty, under which anyone can sign up in return for a payout. Several unemployed youths, with no connection to MEND or any other movement, are looking forward to collecting their N150,000 in return for a stage-managed disavowal of militancy.Okah predicts that only a few would take up the amnesty, and he dismissed any role for outside mediators. He is also sceptical about government promises to move the federal Oil Ministry to the Delta: I think its just another avenue for clawing back revenue from the Niger Delta.On 15 July, the Minister for the Niger Delta, Ufot Ekaette, welcomed MENDs offer of a sixty-day ceasefire. But the new Defence Minister, Major-General Godwin Abbe (retired), told the Federal Executive Council in Abuja that the armed forces would neither accept nor reject the ceasefire offer. Gen. Abbe specifically rejected MENDs demand that the JTF withdraw from Gbaramatu as a precondition of talks. Tompolos fighters suspect the JTF is building a new barracks near Camp Five which overlooks the strategically important network of creeks and camps next to Escravos.At the Police Officers Mess in Port Harcourt, Inspector General Mike Okiro echoed the no preconditions line: Nobody will go to the creeks to force the militants out to take amnesty. It is voluntary. Once the period expires, that means you dont want it. The implicit threat is those militants who do not accept the amnesty will face an unprecedented onslaught from the military who have become an occupying force in the creeks and estuaries of the Delta. Okiro implausibly claims that huge quantities of arms have been recovered through the amnesty.Delta historians draw parallels between this amnesty and a similar deal with gang leaders Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo Asari and Ateke Tom in 2004. That failed dismally because the agenda for talks was little more than a discussion about a sophisticated protection racket.The lack of an effective disarmament programme and credible strategy to create jobs, let alone any attempt to staunch the siphoning of capital by local gangsters, oil companies and Nigerian officials, means the fundamental conditions for conflict remain unchanged: mass poverty and minimal social welfare against a backdrop of corporate and political venality.There are few signs of new thinking on the horizon, just a few changes in the dramatis personae. Faced with growing reputational damage from its Nigerian operations, Shell is considering selling all its on-shore operations by the end of next year. Bidders may include Russias Gazprom, China National Overseas Oil Corporation and Frances Total, so few expect corporate governance to improve.Neither is substantive political change likely in the near future. The already loosely federated militant movement is likely to splinter as leaders pursue their interests. Ateke Tom will accept amnesty if the price is right, and Tompolo is unlikely to cut a national deal and may further increase his local following. However, as oil revenues plummet, YarAdua faces pressure at the national level to resolve the Delta crisis, but his approach looks set to be military not political. l

gambia

Fifteen years of one-man rule

Few outsiders are prepared to support the doughty opponents of Yahya Jammehs corrupt and brutal regime

Since Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh led a succesful coup just 15 years ago on 22 July 1994, he has managed his small country against strong domestic complaints, but without much interference from the neighbours. His regime poses no noticeable threat to the region at least while, as at present, the festering problems of Senegals Casamance region are on hold. The summit meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) in Abuja in June spent a lot of time on the recent overthrow of the governments of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, and on the drive for a third term by President Mamadou Tandja in Niger. Gambia was left alone. However, Ecowas has been doing its bit to see that Jammeh obeys the rules. In June 2008 the Ecowas court ruled that a disappeared journalist, Ebrima Manneh of the Daily Observer, had been unlawfully detained; Jammehs government denies all knowledge of the detention and rejects the courts jurisdiction. (Jammeh is reported to have said at one point: The Ecowas court can go to hell.) Manneh has not been found. Another Gambian journalist, Musa Saidykhan, editor-in-chief of the banned Independent, won in June (against Gambian objections) a landmark ruling that the court is mandated by an Ecowas protocol to hear cases of human rights abuses. This concerned in particular Saidykhans writ against the notorious National Intelligence Agency, in whose headquarters he was held for a month in 2006 without charge. Saidykhan claims he was tortured. Ecowas was also brought into the affair of Ghanaian fishermen killed in Gambia in 2005, which has poisoned relations for some time. At the request of the two governments, a joint United Nations/Ecowas fact-finding mission set up in August 2008 published its report in May. The report says that they had been victims of an immigration scam perpetrated by Captain Taylor and Lamin Tunkara, a Gambian, to transport them to Europe by sea and that while there was no official government involvement, rogue elements of the Gambian security services were involved in the killing. This led to moves to settle with Ghana. The numbers of those killed or disappeared (which included citizens of other West African countries) was still uncertain. Gambia mentions eight, while Ghana claims forty-four.The Banul government, noting the exoneration of the Gambian state over the killings, still agreed to repatriate the bodies of six identified Ghanaians and compensate the families. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed on 2 July by the two governments in Sirte, Libya, at the African Union summit at which they agreed to pursue through all available means the arrest and prosecution of all those involved in the deaths and disappearances. This may not seem to go very far, but there is at least some implied acknowledgement by the Gambians of responsibility, as well as a commitment to continued investigation. The ruling National Democratic Congress in Ghana made a big issue of the matter while in opposition and Ghanaian public opinion continues to be exercised on the subject. There is a strong Nigerian community in Banjul, where five Nigerian banks have opened their doors. Ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo would occasionally pull rank on Jammeh, whom he regarded as a very junior officer, he mediated in judiciary problems in 2005, but President Umaru Musa YarAdua has shown little interest. His Foreign Minister, Ojo Maduekwe, has been heavily involved in Ecowas and was a witness to the Ghana-Gambia MoU in Sirte. Nigeria encouraged Gambia to send 98 policemen to the UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Sudan.Senegal, which surrounds Gambias landward side, keeps a watching eye on it, treating Jammeh with kid gloves for fear he might allow Gambia to be used for subversive activities in Casamance. His relations with the provinces rebels have sometimes been suspect, but Casamance is quiet now. President Abdoulaye Wade barely hides his contempt for Jammeh, but the only serious rift came four years ago when Gambia tried to tax Senegalese traders at the border. Obasanjo stepped in to mediate and one result was a proposal to revive both the Senegambia Secretariat and the long-mooted bridge on the River Gambia, but nothing happened. Senegal is also anxious that Gambia might get involved in Guinea-Bissaus turbulent, drug-beset politics, but Jammeh has kept clear of the international drug trades dabblings in West Africa.Libyas links to Gambia have flourished since Jammeh came to power; his predecessor, Sir Dawda Jawara was deeply hostile to Moammar el Gadaffi. The Libyan leader is a quieter character now (although unpredictable), and Gambia is regularly represented at meetings of the 29-member Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which includes all 15 members of Ecowas and forms Libyas tame African grouping. Figures for Libyan assistance are elusive (although Jammeh got US$15 million in 1995, after his take-over). Libyas contribution is probably next to that of the leading benefactor, Taiwan, which Gambia persists in recognising. A glowing tribute from Gadaffi on Jammehs birthday (25 May) contrasted with his rebuke to those, notably Sierra Leones President Ernest Koroma, who did not make it to the CEN-SAD summit in Libya four days later. Jammeh strongly supported Gadaffis move at the AU summit to defy the International Criminal Courts warrant for Sudanese President Omer el Beshir. He attended the Non-Aligned Summit in Egypt in mid-July.For a regime that began with a coup, Jammeh has survived remarkably well. Britain says little about Jammehs human-rights violations, except when those in trouble are British nationals. Jammeh has not visited London since the Commonwealth summit in 1997, probably because of campaigning by London-based organisations. Amnesty Internationals damning report The Gambia: Fear Rules, in November 2008, was followed by a statement in March denouncing the security services rounding up and punishing of a thousand alleged witches, said to have been treated by witch-doctors brought in from Guinea. (In March, around 1,000 people were detained on suspicion of being witches. They said they were forced to drink a hallucinogenic beverage which induced vomiting and diarrhoea. They were released in April.) In Africa the Commonwealth tends to take its cue from its African members, and in 2001 removed Gambia from the list of countries under scrutiny for their human-rights record. Jammeh seized power a few months after completing his training as a military policeman in Alabama; he is still an honorary officer of that states militia, and of the Alabama State Navy. Some Gambians suspect his coup was tacitly backed by the United States, and he sometimes tries to market himself to Washington as a reliable ally in the war against terror. Yet Gambias participation in the Milliennium Challenge Account was suspended seven years ago because of its human rights situation. In May this year, five US Senators petitioned Jammeh over Ebrima Mannehs three-year disappearance. They said Gambian indifference was reprehensible and outrageous. President Jammeh, they wrote: You owe the world and Mannehs family an answer. l

liberia

analysis

Charles Taylor gets his day in Court

Ex-President Charles Taylors trial at the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity will reverberate across Africa, especially those countries such as Congo-Kinshasa, Uganda and Sudan, whose politicians and rebel leaders face indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. The relaying of television images showing Charles Taylor in the dock answering charges of crimes against humanity is concentrating minds, notably that of the African Union Chairman, Libyas Moammar el Gadaffi who trained and armed Taylors soldiers.

TAYLOR TAKES ThE STANDAt last, Charles Taylor gets his day in court. He took the stand before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) for the first time on 14 July to testify in his own defence. His trial is taking place in The Hague, Netherlands, rather than in Sierra Leone, for security reasons. Taylor, President of Liberia from 1997 to 2003, is likely to be in the witness box for several weeks. His lead counsel, Courtenay Griffiths, QC, is one of Britains most experienced criminal defence lawyers, having taken on several murder and terrorism cases. Taylor claims, among other grievances, that he is a victim of Western racism. Cross-examination will be by one of the prosecution team led by Stephen Rapp, former United States Attorney for the Northern District of Iowa. Among those most likely to be entrusted with the all-important cross-examination of Taylor are prosecution lawyers Brenda Hollis, a former lawyer for the US Air Force, and Nick Koumjian, formerly a public prosecutor in Los Angeles and a veteran of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Taylors trial began on 4 June 2007 with a false start. The former head of state fired his defence team, claiming that he had insufficient resources for an effective defence. He demanded that the Court find replacements. The Court agreed, which is how Courtenay Griffiths, aided by a substantial team, got the job. We hear that the costs of Taylors defence are around US$100,000 a month. However, Griffiths has complained to the Open Society Institute, funded by George Soros, about the imbalance of resources allocated to the prosecution and the defence. My team has only come on board since August of last year. Some members of the prosecution team have been working on this case for five years or more. We are four lawyers working for us. Last time we counted, the Prosecution were deploying something like eight different lawyers in court. Taylors defence is paid by the Court as he has declared himself to be without funds. When he was still President of Liberia, he was accustomed to handling millions of dollars. No one knows how much of his money remains or where he keeps it. The general assumption is that he has made over his assets to his family and friends. The Court has been trying to trace those assets without much success so far. A defiant Taylor declaimed, I challenge the United Nations and any human being on this planet to bring one bank account to the SCSL. Bring the millions here, please.After Taylors new team established themselves, court hearings began in January 2008. The prosecution presented 91 witnesses including Varmuyan Sherif, who claimed to be one of the highest level Taylor allies willing to testify against him. Sherif testified about Taylors arms trade routes used to break sanctions on Sierra Leone. The former Liberian leader provided his own robust defence, saying that Sherif was on the streets, naked and eating from garbage during the conflict.Now it is the turn of the defence, which has listed 249 witnesses. It is likely that the number actually appearing for the defence will be considerably less than that. In any event, no verdict is expected before 2010 at the soonest. Neither the judges nor the defence team appear hurried. The SCSL was set up following the tumultuous events of 1999-2000 that provide much of the backdrop for Taylors trial. This sequence of events began with an attack on Freetown in January 1999 by forces of the combined rebel movements of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front. The prosecution alleges that the RUF was little more than a proxy force controlled by Taylor, and that its actions in Sierra Leone amounted to a joint criminal conspiracy masterminded by Taylor. The first Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL, David Crane, who drafted the original indictment against Taylor, viewed him as the source of widespread disruption and multiple intrigues throughout West Africa. RUF leader Foday Sankoh had been with Taylor in Libya in the late 1980s as both men prepared armed forces for wars in their respective countries with the support of their sponsor, Libyan leader Moammar el Gadaffi. The prosecution has alluded to commercial and political links between Taylor, Gadaffi and Burkina Fasos President Blaise Compaor, whose regime facilitated arms transfers to Taylor and earned illicit revenues from Liberian resources. Subsequently, Gadaffi and Compaor have disowned their association with Taylor and have made their peace with the USA and Britain. Taylor claims that the RUF had nothing to do with him and that he in fact acted as a peacemaker in the Sierra Leone war. On 21 July, he told the Court that his relationship with RUF leader Sankoh was restricted to a period between August 1991 and May 1992: My relationship with Foday Sankoh was for security purposes to fight ULIMO [the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy] in Sierra Leone so as to prevent them fighting in Liberia. Taylor claimed that ULIMO was sponsored by the Sierra Leonean government. ATROCITIES AND AMPUTATIONSThe atrocities committed during the January 1999 battle of Freetown especially amputations of hands and arms prompted worldwide revulsion. A peace treaty between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF in July 1999, the Lom Accord, resulted in RUF leader Foday Sankoh sharing power in Sierra Leone. The United Nations set up a mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, to supervise the peace. In May 2000, after the RUF took hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage bringing the UN mission to the brink of disaster, a UN spokesman said the peacekeepers would be unable to protect the capital from a rebel invasion. That prompted British Prime Minister Tony Blair to call an emergency cabinet meeting which scrambled a British protection force for Freetown; following Africa Confidentials exposure (AC Vol 39 No 5) of the British governments cooperation with Sandline, a British private military company, Whitehall was under pressure to use its own armed forces to shore up the UN and Economic Community of West African States regional forces in Sierra Leone. It turned out to be one of the few popular military interventions that Tony Blair ever authorised.The British and US governments viewed Taylor as the real power behind the RUF. It was in these circumstances that, on 12 June 2000, Sierra Leonean President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (himself a former UN official) wrote to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asking for help in establishing a body to take legal action against those responsible for the war. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1315 on 14 August 2000, mandating Secretary General Annan to negotiate a deal with the government of Sierra Leone. The Special Court was formally established in January 2002, providing for the prosecution of the people bearing greatest responsibility for the war. President Tejan Kabbah declared Sierra Leones civil war to be over. The Special Court is a hybrid. Unlike the Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, it is not run by the UN alone. And unlike the International Criminal Court with which it is often confused, it has jurisdiction over only one country and will close down when the current prosecutions are finished. It is governed by both international law and Sierra Leonean law. The judges are both Sierra Leonean and international, and are appointed jointly by the UN and the government of Sierra Leone. Taylor is being judged by a bench consisting of Richard Lussick (Samoa), Teresa Doherty (United Kingdom) and Julia Sebutinde (Uganda). They are assisted by a substitute, El Hadji Malick Sow (Senegal), whose job is to take over if one of the main judges is incapacitated. FALLOUT IN WEST AFRICA The Special Court has had a mixed record. Many Sierra Leoneans wonder why it has spent so much money pursuing a handful of former warlords rather than spreading the money more widely. Particularly controversial was the Courts prosecution of the late Sam Hinga Norman, leader of the Civil Defence Force that included the Kamajor militias. Norman was held responsible for war crimes committed by the Kamajors (traditional hunters) and other CDF units although he had only ever been his countrys Deputy Minister of Defence the Defence portfolio was actually held by President Tejan Kabbah. By this logic, if anyone was to blame for crimes committed by the CDF it should have been Tejan Kabbah himself, not his number two for military affairs. In any case, many Sierra Leoneans, especially from Tejan Kabbahs Sierra Leone Peoples Party, saw Norman as a national hero for taking on the RUF. They did not think anyone should have been indicted for the work done by the CDF. Taylors prosecution is the last by the SCSL. Most Sierra Leoneans will probably be glad to see the Court end its work and dissolve itself. Taylor has few friends in Sierra Leone, so there will be little concern if he is convicted. It is different in neighbouring Liberia. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is celebrated internationally as Africas first female head of state. After years working for the UN, Johnson Sirleaf has many friends in the international system and is close to billionaire George Soros. At home, Johnson Sirleaf is less fted. Her government has been unable to control parliament and her critics claim it marks a return to the hegemony of Americo-Liberian families that ran Liberia before the 1980 coup that brought Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe to power, the start of a quarter-century of mayhem. In fact, Johnson Sirleaf is not Americo-Liberian as often claimed by foreign critics: her father was Gola, and her mother was half-German and half-Kru. For two years after winning the 2005 presidential elections, Johnson Sirleafs government was seen to be bringing some real improvement to Liberia. Since then, the government has become embroiled in a succession of corruption scandals, some of which critics claim are linked to funding a presidential re-election campaign for 2011. TRUTh AWAITS RECONCILIATIONOn the Liberian street, Charles Taylor remains surprisingly popular. Former child soldiers in his militia are now unemployed adults, who think nostalgically about the old days. Taylors supporters claim that Monrovias Americo-Liberian ruling clique is monopolising business under Johnson Sirleaf. Many of his former ministers and generals have made new relationships, but they could rally to Taylor if his political career were to reignite. The Liberian press reports in depth on the Taylor trial whenever an interesting witness is on the stand. The publication of the final report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has prompted debate (AC Vol 50 No 14), particularly its recommendation that Johnson Sirleaf be excluded from public office in the future because she offered material and political support to Taylor in the early stages of the civil war that broke out in 1989. However, Johnson Sirleaf was hardly Taylors leading supporter in those days and the TRC report contained no argument to justify the recommendation of her exclusion, which was simply dropped in to the document. It seems to have been planted by political rivals anxious to disqualify her from re-election in 2011. If Taylor were to be acquitted by the SCSL, it would upset Liberian politics. He could gather enough support to revive his career and to fulfil his parting words when he left the country in August 2003: God willing, I will be back. Nor is it only in Liberia and Sierra Leone that observers are waiting for bombshells from Taylor, who is widely regarded as having information that he could divulge in court that would interest many and unnerve some. The former warlord and ex-head of state is assumed to have knowledge of many affairs affecting the USA, starting with the exact circumstances of his mysterious escape from a Massachusetts prison in 1985. Taylor testified in mid-July that it was the Central Intelligence Agency that was involved in his gaol-break. According to Taylor, it was part of a US plot to arm Liberian commander Thomas Quiwonkpa to overthrow the dictator Doe; Quiwonkpas coup attempt ultimately failed to unseat the regime. He has already revealed in court that when he was arrested in Nigeria and handed over to the custody of the SCSL in 2006, he was travelling in a four-car convoy with members of the Nigerian security services. His protector, President Olusegun Obasanjo, was in Washington DC at the time. This strongly suggests that Obasanjo was bullied by the US government into delivering Taylor to the Court against his own will. l

ellen johnson sirleaf – the sequelPresident Ellen Johnson Sirleaf looks set to seek a second six-year term in the 2011 elections. This is despite a recommendation from Liberias Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) barring her and several others from public office for 30 years after they had admitted to supporting Charles Taylors war against the Samuel Doe regime.To boost her chances in 2011, Johnson Sirleafs governing Unity Party (UP) has merged with the Liberian Action Party of former 2005 Presidential candidate Varney Sherman and the Liberia Unification Party. (The LAP and LUP united as the Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia [COTOL] in the 2005 elections.) Johnson Sirleaf will be the presidential candidate and Sherman the running mate on the merged partys ticket.COTOL controls 15 seats in Liberias 94-member bicameral legislature; the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Jenekai Alex Tyler, and the Senate President, Cletus Wotorson, are from COTOL. A merger with Johnson Sirleafs Unity Party would give the new group control of 26 seats, making it the biggest grouping ahead of former international footballer George Weahs Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), which has 18 seats. Sherman, who called Johnson Sirleaf a white collar rebel during the 2005 presidential campaign, is now committed to an alliance with her and says he will challenge the TRCs recommendation to bar her from office. His party colleagues also insist that the legislature has the final word on the TRCs report.However, Johnson Sirleafs opponents are trying to use the TRC report to block her second term bid. Winston Tubman, a former United Nations diplomat in Somalia, merged his party with Weahs CDC on 23 June. Tubman told the TRC in October that Johnson Sirleaf was the mother of Liberias brutal conflict. Weah lost to Johnson Sirleaf by 41% to 59% in run-off elections in November 2005 although he won backing from candidates such as Tubman, Sherman and Togba-Nah Tipoteh. Weah is popular among poor Liberians whose lives have improved little under Johnson Sirleaf and who are angered by the unfolding reports of corruption scandals in the government. Weah and Tubman say they are disappointed by the lack of progress on national reconciliation, the growth of violent crime and poor living standards. They claim that Johnson Sirleaf has done little to tackle those senior officials accused of corruption and instead focused on low-ranking government workers. Recently, she sent written warnings on corruption to all cabinet ministers, saying all representatives and ministers proved to be involved in corruption would lose their jobs.As the political realignments continue, the competition is intensifying. Charles Brumskine, the Liberty Party leader who came third in the 2005 presidential elections winning 13.9% of the votes cast, is to join Weah and Tubman (who won 9.2%). It is less clear what will happen to Taylors National Patriotic Party (NPP), which took 1% in 2005.Johnson Sirleafs UP has been trying to woo loyalists in the CDC and even in Taylors NPP. CDC officials, some of whom had a hand in the TRC report, are determined to use it against her. We will remain resolute to ensure that she will not stand for the second term, because of the TRC report, a CDC spokesman told Africa Confidential. Even Charles Taylor has confirmed in his testimony at The Hague that she was not only a financier, but a founder of the NPFL [National Patriotic Front of Liberia] rebel movement.However, Johnson Sirleaf is trying to recruit NPP stalwarts into the government. She recently appointed Roland Massaquoi, NPP presidential candidate in 2005, as the Chairman of the Board of the Liberia Produce and Marketing Corporation and NPP youth leader Emmanuel Lomax as a director. She has given two junior ministerial posts to influential NPP youth organisers at the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Planning and Economic Affairs. Despite this, NPP Secretary General John Whitefield said he would prefer to merge his party with the CDC but Francis Garlawolo, a founding member of the NPP, has switched his support to Unity Party-led coalition.The CDCs problem is that all of their leaders Tubman, Weah and Brumskine are determined to stand as its presidential candidate. Tubman has told several newspapers that his dream is to become president; the popular but political underdog Weah says he is determined to contest the 2011 elections, while Brumskine said in 2005 that a group of religious healers envisioned him as president. l

international justice and its pitfallsThe current array of international tribunals has its roots in the 1990s. With the Cold War over, a spate of atrocious wars broke out in areas that no longer fell under the control or influence of one or another superpower. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda exposed a rich vein of Western hypocrisy. Western governments poured scorn on the failures of the United Nations in Rwanda, though the same governments lobbied hard to prevent the characterisation of the mass killings as genocide, which would have implied a legal obligation for UN member states to act. On 21 April 1994, when the genocide was under way in Rwanda, Britain, France and the United States drafted and pushed through a Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of all but 270 of the UN peacekeepers under the command of Canadas General Romeo Dallaire, who was outraged by this manoeuvre. He and his meagre force still managed to save thousands of lives, but the UN resolution and the subsequent withdrawal denied protection to tens of thousands of Rwandans who were left to die at the hands of the Interahamwe death squads. In the face of Western governments reluctance to confront murderous regimes, at least those that did not control strategic resources, human rights groups pressed for the expansion of international justice by the establishment of an international court. Backed by international law and the UN, the hope was that such a court might pressure all regimes or even militia groups to accept some basic humanitarian laws. George W. Bushs administration refused to ratify the USAs signing of the Rome statutes establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) or any other body that could have jurisdiction over US citizens. Pressed to take action on the war in Sierra Leone, it saw the Special Court for Sierra Leone as a suitable instrument with a limited mandate. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has been a disappointment. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia tribunal is facing its biggest test with the trial of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadjic.Piqued by the Bush Administrations opposition to the ICC and by its poor human rights record, Democratic Party sympathisers from Hollywood and the media have queued up to support the ICC and to call for action on Darfur.George Clooney, Mia Farrow, Angelina Jolie and Madonna from the US and the Irish rock musician Bono speak out on human rights in Africa, giving impulse to public opinion. Western politicians with little stake in African wars prefer to pass the problem to the prosecutors. However, since the ICC was established, a US-led coalition has invaded Iraq and the US government has detained enemy combatants without trial in Guatanamo Bay. For many in Africa, calls for international justice ring hollow especially when the USA and Israel (let alone China and Russia) refuse to join the ICC. The ICC has issued indictments against militia leaders in Congo-Kinshasa, Uganda and against Sudans President Omer el Beshir.According to opinion polls across Africa this month, there is substantial popular support for the indictment of President Omer, despite Libyan leader Moammar el Gadaffis corralling of African leaders at the AU in opposition to it (AC Vol 50 No 14).Wily African presidents have discovered that they can use an indictment by an international court as a weapon against domestic enemies, but the indictees are fighting back. Ugandas Joseph Kony has used the charges against him to derail talks with the government. Omer, helped by Gadaffi and Egypts Hosni Mubarak (both of whose regimes are threatened by Khartoums Islamist allies), is trying to ignore the ICC warrant although this week he cancelled a trip to Uganda after a Foreign Ministry official in Kampala suggested he would be arrested; Omer failed to attend South African President Jacob Zumas inauguration for the same reason. Former Liberian President Charles Taylors defence counsel argues that his clients indictment represents the use of a judicial instrument to manipulate an African head of state.A strong lobby by no means all apologists for tyrants argue that the ICCs decision to indict people who are still at large and whom the Court has no means of arresting will invite disaster. A couple of failed prosecutions, and the ICC will risk losing its prestige and its clout. Almost a century ago, US President Theodore Roosevelt wrote: I have always been fond of the West African proverb: Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far. Now the ICC seems to have reversed this African dictum. l

congo-kinshasa

Eastern foes at war again

Foreign attempts to strengthen the army and police, led by Monuc and the EU, are inchoate, ineffective and under-funded

Things are getting worse in eastern Congo, and everyone except the government and the United Nations Mission in Congo, Monuc, acknowledges it. Recent operations by the Congolese army, the Forces Armes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo (FARDC), in cooperation with Monuc did nothing to quell the insurgency. Many improvements are suggested, not least from the United States, but few of them involve a clear understanding of what is involved. The recent Operation Kimia (Calm in Swahili) II was aimed at local militias and rebel forces from Rwanda and Uganda. In early July Oxfam published a survey which showed that 85% of Congolese civilians thought the situation had gotten worse since Kimia. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the fighting drove 300,000 people from their homes in North Kivu, and 100,000 in South Kivu. In June, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that 8,000 more people were displaced in North Kivu, and 17,000 in Orientale Province. The last attempt to deal with the rebels was Operation Umoja Wetu (Our Peace) in January, when the FARDC combined with the Rwanda Defence Force to try to disarm and send home the Hutu militiamen of the Forces Dmocratiques de Libration du Rwanda (FDLR). They failed. This time the FARDC, although advised by a clutch of foreign experts (see Box), proved to be completely disorganised. Tens of thousands of fighters from various Mai-Mai groups, and from the Conseil National pour la Dfense du Peuple led by the Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda (now under house arrest in Rwanda) were supposed to have been integrated into the national army, but without effect. Military advisers in the European Unions EUSEC mission for security reform in Congo (see Box) trying to prevent officers from stealing the pay due to their men had set up a chain of command separate from the chain of pay. After not being paid for months, many soldiers were fed up, hungry and indisciplined. The results were mutiny, pillage and mass desertion. Entire companies of government soldiers turned themselves into independent raiding parties. Units whose members were mainly Hutu (from Congo or Rwanda), joined up with their fellows in the FDLR, whom they were meant to be fighting. The FARDCs allies in Monuc did not fully join in the fight and are anyway short of men. Late last year President Nicolas Sarkozy said France would not send reinforcements until Monuc had deployed its existing troops more efficiently. Only in mid-July did UN Special Representative Ross Mountain announce that more blue helmets would be transferred from western Congo to the east where they are needed. On 14, July a Belgian C-130 heavy-lift aircraft was sent to Kisangani to move men and equipment. Unbeaten, the FDLRs well-organised forces control land and mines, levying charges and raising taxes. They are now more mobile than ever, free to raid and harrass. In early July they reached the outskirts of Goma: Monuc reported that the rebels had attacked FARDC positions at Kaseghe, along with their Mai-Mai allies of the Patriotes Rsistants Congolais. On 1 July, 130 houses were burned at Miriki, an i