By Trevor Ncube
Zimbabweans should not have to lose their savings again before those in authority confront the dangerous entanglement of political power, banking interests and financial regulation.
When a financial institution collapses, the impact reaches far beyond its shareholders. It enters kitchens, classrooms and hospital wards.
What happened in Paraguay last week should trouble our national conscience. We have suffered enough financial trauma to recognise a warning without waiting for it to become our own emergency.
On November 6, President Santiago Peña was impeached and placed under house arrest following the collapse of Ueno Bank. The bank served approximately 2.94 million customers, equivalent to about 60% of Paraguay’s adult population. Its accounts were frozen, and substantial public and pension funds were caught in the crisis.
Peña previously held shares in the business group behind Ueno and says he sold his interest in 2025. He appointed Carlos Carvallo, a former head of Ueno, as central bank governor. Lawmakers have alleged preferential treatment of the collapsed Ueno Bank and improper handling of public funds. Reuters also reports the central bank’s position that Carvallo recused himself from Ueno decisions.
The institutional question remains: how effectively can a regulator supervise a bank when the relationships surrounding it reach into the highest offices of government?
Zimbabwe needs to answer that question now.
We carry our own painful history: Barbican, Trust, Royal, Interfin, Allied, AfrAsia, Genesis and Tetrad. Their experiences differed, encompassing curatorship, disputed restructuring, liquidation and surrender of licences. They cannot honestly be reduced to one explanation.
There is documented evidence of both banking misconduct and unlawful regulatory action. In 2012, the RBZ attributed Interfin’s distress partly to non-performing insider and related-party exposures, inadequate capital and poor oversight. In the Trust Bank litigation, the Supreme Court found the sale and transfer of its assets to ZABG unlawful, even though it dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds.
That history demands safeguards against reckless bankers and regulators who exceed their powers. Depositors need competent, independent supervision, enforceable rules and lawful intervention. Institutional independence must be enhanced by accountability.
The present concerns begin with Reserve Bank Governor John Mushayavanhu and FBC.
Mushayavanhu previously led FBC Holdings. A 2020 stock exchange disclosure recorded his indirect beneficial shareholding through Tirent Investments. FBC’s 2023 annual report identified him in the beneficiaries column against Tirent’s 6.82% holding.
The group’s 2025 annual report, on page 203, again lists Tirent with 6.82%, approximately 45.84 million shares. This time the beneficiary is identified as the Mushayavanhu Family Trust. These are the company’s published disclosures.
Mushayavanhu denied holding an interest in FBC in an interview reported by the Zimbabwe Independent in April 2024. That denial must be recorded alongside the disclosures. The 2025 report does not establish his present entitlement to trust benefits or control over its decisions. It does establish the need for an authoritative and exhaustive explanation of those arrangements. Ethical and principled leadership demands this transparency and accountability.
Zimbabweans should not have to guess whether the person overseeing their banks retains an interest in one of the groups he supervises. And we must not be shy to ask these important questions of those who serve the public. At a minimum, they owe the public this much. The slightest whiff of suspicion erodes public trust and must be avoided at all times.
Section 16(a) of the RBZ Act disqualifies a shareholder, director, officer or employee of a banking institution from serving as Governor or Deputy Governor. Its application to interests held through a holding company or family trust requires independent legal scrutiny. Parliament should obtain and publish that assessment. Any incompatibility must be remedied; any ambiguity concerning indirect beneficial ownership must be resolved.
The law must mean the same thing to the politically connected and powerful as it does to the man on the street.
The allegations concerning President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ownership interest in FBC remain unverified on the evidence available to me. I will not turn rumour into fact. The Presidency can help resolve the uncertainty through an authoritative declaration of relevant interests.
Kudakwashe Tagwirei’s position continues a trend of entangled interests and raises a further question of public duty.
A close ally and confidant of President Mnangagwa, Tagwirei was recently appointed as Minister of Economic Development and Investment Promotion. Tagwirei has also been linked to investments in CBZ Holdings and ZB Financial Holdings, the groups behind CBZ Bank and ZB Bank.
Zimbabwe Independent reporting on NSSA’s 2020 disposal of ZB shares described speculation linking him to the transaction and reported him as a major CBZ shareholder.
The companies’ disclosures establish something narrower. CBZ’s 2025 annual report lists Akribos Wealth Managers Nominees with 18.35%. ZB’s shareholder analysis lists Datvest Nominees with 34%. Both figures are dated December 31, 2025. Neither entry, by itself, identifies Tagwirei as the ultimate beneficial owner. Nominee accounts can hold shares for different clients.
In August 2026, Nehanda Radio, citing NewsHawks, reported his denial of a purported CBZ share sale: “I have not sold anything. It’s not true.” A denial of a sale settles neither the existence nor the extent of a current holding.
I therefore cannot responsibly assign him a verified current percentage in either group. The distinction between published allegations and demonstrated ownership matters.
So does the obligation of all public officials to answer legitimate questions. Holding public office or owning a publicly traded asset carries a burden of accountability. Journalists asking questions are merely carrying out their duty of informing stakeholders.
Section 106 of our Constitution prohibits ministers from exposing themselves to situations involving a risk of conflict between their official responsibilities and private interests. It addresses the risk itself. It does not require the nation to wait for a scandal before demanding preventive action. Unfortunately, this is one aspect of the Constitution that is mostly ignored by Cabinet ministers, past and present.
Tagwirei should publish a verified declaration of his current beneficial interests in banking and other businesses relevant to his portfolio, including interests exercised through nominees, trusts or controlled companies.
My position is clear: he should divest any banking interests that conflict with his ministerial responsibilities. If he cannot resolve those conflicts, he should relinquish the ministerial office. Transferring a name on paper while retaining control or economic benefit would not resolve the underlying problem.
Alternatively, Tagwirei should place his interests in a blind trust until such time as he is out of public office. This should apply to all government ministers with business interests that present potential conflicts of interest.
Public service requires accepting limits on private advantage. Business success cannot purchase an exemption from that principle.
My primary concern is the transparency and quality of the safeguards protecting the entire system, particularly the investing public and the clients of these institutions.
In our small and timid society, a supervisor might hesitate to challenge an institution associated with a powerful superior. A minister’s commercial interests might benefit from decisions over which he has influence. Pension trustees might mistake political proximity for financial security. Competitors might reasonably question whether the rules are applied equally.
These are legitimate and foreseeable risks. Responsible leadership designs institutions capable of resisting them.
When Gideon Gono appeared on In Conversation With Trevor, he described the central bank’s lack of independence as “the elephant in the room”. He specifically identified control by a line ministry as a weakness. Tag suspicions about bank ownership by the Governor to the elephant, and you have an acute entanglement of interests.
Our law helps explain the problem. The President appoints the Governor and the appointed members of the RBZ board after consulting the responsible minister. The Act also makes the Governor’s management functions subject to general policy directions from the minister or board.
This soup is crying out for urgent reform if we are really open for ethical and principled business.
I propose an independent statutory appointments board, constituted through an open process with safeguards against political and commercial capture, to appoint the Governor and RBZ board. Candidates should face published competence requirements, disclosure of interests and public parliamentary hearings. Appointments should require parliamentary confirmation.
The Governor should have a protected term and be removable only on specified, demonstrable grounds through a fair process. The RBZ should report publicly to Parliament, with audited accounts and meaningful scrutiny of its decisions.
In making these suggestions, I am alive to the urgent need to reform Parliament to ensure it has the right calibre of individuals to push back against executive overreach.
This is a proposed model for Zimbabwe. International practice does not prescribe one universal appointments mechanism. Its essential test is whether supervision can operate independently, competently and accountably.
A new appointments process will achieve little if officials still receive informal instructions about which institutions or borrowers are beyond scrutiny. Interference must be documented, investigated and sanctioned.
Forty-six years after independence, we should have the maturity to build institutions that serve the public beyond the tenure of any president, minister or governor.
We are all imperfect. Good intentions do not remove temptation. The purpose of sound institutions is to make doing the right thing easier and abusing power harder.
Further reforms must follow established international standards.
Zimbabwe must enforce limits on connected lending and require commercial terms, independent approvals and proper aggregation of exposures. Several companies controlled by the same interests cannot become separate risks merely by acquiring different names.
Pension and public funds require particular vigilance. FBC’s 2025 report lists the National Pension Scheme with 35.13% and Public Service Fund 2–OLDM with 11.33%. Together, they own 46.46% of FBC.
This is a sobering reminder of whose money is at stake. Trustees must assess total exposure, publish investment criteria and resist political pressure. Workers’ retirement contributions must never become a convenient source of financing for favoured interests.
Parliament should now hold public hearings on the disclosed and alleged interests discussed here, secure the relevant records and publish findings on compliance and necessary reforms. The Governor, Tagwirei, the Presidency and the banks should answer the documented questions and have their responses fairly examined.
President Mnangagwa has a particular responsibility to ensure that his appointees meet the Constitution’s standards and that public institutions can operate without fear or favour.
Those of us in business, the professions, churches and the media also have responsibilities. We cannot demand investment and confidence while treating uncomfortable questions about powerful people as bad manners. Access to authority is a poor bargain if its price is our silence.
No one can confidently identify where Zimbabwe’s next banking shock might originate. That uncertainty makes sound institutions more urgent.
Paraguay’s depositors are paying for a crisis whose full causes are still being investigated. Zimbabwe has the opportunity to act while reform remains a choice.
Our people deserve to work, save and retire with confidence. Building that confidence requires principled leaders and institutions strong enough to restrain them when courage and principle fail.
We should not need another queue of frightened depositors to remind us whom public power is supposed to serve.
Trevor Ncube is the Founder of Trevor & Associates, Chairman of Alpha Media Holdings and the anchor of In Conversation With Trevor.
Post published in: Featured