Restrictive measures in Zimbabwe – the way forward

Any review of restrictive measures must involve assessing the impact of the measures and the consequences of future options, namely: continuing the current scheme; a temporary lift; or an unconditional removal of the measures, says the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA):

According to many of those interviewed from both Zanu-PF and the MDC, restrictive measures have not worked as Zanu (PF) continues to obstruct the GPA. The restrictive measures currently in place have thus failed to change the behaviours of those targeted; although political reforms have been achieved and must be recognised.

In an interview with Zimbabwean Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, he stated that the review of restrictive measures must consider the progress that has been achieved by the GNU, but, and most critically, restrictive measures must be linked to the broader goal of free and fair elections followed by a smooth transfer of power for whichever party wins the election.

The lack of a consensus among the West, the SADC (including South Africa) and the Zimbabwean internal actors has undermined all measures in place. Observers conclude that a lack of cooperation by Zanu (PF) will continue amid low-levels of violence and with little attempt to build the capacity of a GPA mandated Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Human Rights Commission and Media Commission.

As with the current constitutional reform process, credible reports of intimidation and violence, the modus operandi of Zanu (PF), has commenced. Observers posit

that Zanu (PF) has two main goals, the removal of targeted sanctions and the winning of an election at a time of their own choosing.

The GPA and restrictive measures have successfully deprived destabilising elements of some resources that could be utilised for undemocratic means. However, Zanu-PF has a monopoly on the use of force; the army, the police, the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and the Joint Operation Command (JOC).

Zanu (PF) controls informal resources including the war veterans and various youth militias, as well as those benefiting from the land reform process, with an estimated

150,000 families under direct, coercive patronage.

There are approaches that the international community can consider in regard to the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe. Each carry consequences that could alter the current power- sharing dynamics within the GNU.

We have identified three options that can be taken by the international community: maintain the status quo, an unconditional removal of restrictive measures, and the calibrated removal of restrictive measures tied to six benchmarks.

Option 1: Maintain status quo

Maintaining the status quo would do little, if anything, to encourage further concessions from Zanu (PF) or assist in acquiring additional gains within the GPA. Zanu (PF) has successfully framed the sanctions debate within the context of Western neo-colonialism and imperialism.

Maintaining the current restrictions will allow Zanu (PF) to continue to blame the GNUs weaknesses and inadequacies on the West and their sanctions. The MDC will continue to struggle to be perceived as an equal partner within the GNU while risking the perception among ordinary Zimbabweans of being unable to sufficiently govern and make good on election promises.

The West could consider sanctioning members of the MDC-T and MDC-M who are found to be committing similar abuses to those currently under sanction in an effort to show a commitment to democratic values and detract from claims of bias that are consistently sounded by Zanu (PF).

There are further potential political consequences. The current sanctions do not allow for sufficient buy-in from members of the SADC, particularly Zimbabwes influential neighbouring countries Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa, and the MDC.

If sufficient space is not created, nor the opportunities for SADC members to have a greater stake in determining progress and whether certain restrictions should be removed or maintained, the status quo could produce intractable positions among Zimbabwean political parties, members of the SADC, South Africa and the West.

Finally, as this option will most likely prolong the stalemate between Zanu (PF), MDC-M and MDC-T, the risk of an early election to establish a strong mandate for governance and legitimacy is high.

Given the current polarisation within Zimbabwe, as well as the inability of the government to guarantee free and fair elections and ensure security, as well as the contradictory statements by senior commanders within the military regarding their political intentions, a call for elections is likely to engender a violent environment similar to that in the run-up to the 2000 and 2008 elections.

Option 2: Unconditional removal of measures

Secondly, the international community can call Mugabe and Zanu (PF)s bluff and completely lift all restrictive measures. This would remove any obstacles to the implementation of the GPA, as claimed by Mugabe and Zanu (PF), and levy regional and international pressure on Zanu (PF) to act in accordance with its responsibilities and obligations within the GNU.

However, during interviews with senior politicians and politburo members, interviewees on occasion remarked that when sanctions are removed Zanu (PF) will continue to blame Zimbabwes problems on sanctions and those who imposed them. Based on our interviews, we find it unlikely that Zanu-PF will undertake real steps toward implementation of the GPA and will continue to find scapegoats as an excuse for intransigence and obstruction of their responsibilities within the GNU.

Even if sanctions are completely lifted, it is highly unlikely that significant re-engagement would commence with international donors. Development progress will take time.

It would be unlikely that the Ministry of Finance would be able to meet its obligations. Zimbabwes debts with the IFIs would still need to be addressed before new loans will be approved.

While the Ministry of Finance has achieved impressive reforms, greater reforms need to be undertaken within the RBZ to ensure that there are mechanisms in place to make sure that certain resources are utilised properly.

Political consequences of a blanket lifting of restrictive measures could be as severe as

maintaining the status quo. First, international implications could be the perception among Zimbabweans and the SADC of the West as both weak and lacking in political will towards Zimbabwe. Lifting restrictive measures would jeopardise credibility, already seen by some in the lack of coordination among the West, and would diminish the Wests bargaining power and status.

Lifting restrictive measures without sufficient progress would empower Zanu-PF, weaken the ability to level the playing field among the internal parties and stymie the process of democratisation.

Zanu(PF)s monopoly on state media and its menacing behaviour toward independent media are likely to encourage conditions that will allow for a perception that victory has been won over the imperialists and colonialists. Since the implementation of the GPA, Zanu (PF) has shown little goodwill.

The MDC, which has publicly called for the lifting of restrictive measures in accordance

with benchmarks, would be perceived as not having the support of the international community.

Additionally, there could be a risk that the SADC could distance itself further from Zimbabwe and begin pushing an agenda that will see Zimbabwe manage its own affair.

Option 3: Calibrated Removal of measures

We recommend a process that calls for the calibrated removal of restrictive measures tied to six benchmarks: a credible voters roll, an independent electoral commission, media freedom, a constitutional reform process, a land audit and security sector reform, all in cooperation with the SADC vis–vis South Africa. We believe that this option will engender the most agreement among stakeholders.

Benchmark 1: Voters roll

A revised voters roll is a necessity. The voters roll must be entirely redrawn up by non-partisan local and international professionals before the constitutional referendum takes place. Control over the voters roll must be held by a fully independent electoral commission if any future roll is not to be compromised.

Zimbabwe and the international community should look to Kenya as an example of how to embark on a revising the voters roll. Kenya successfully registered approximately 12 million voters in less than six months.

Benchmark 2: Electoral Commission

Zimbabwe needs a non-partisan, independent electoral commission which will ensure the credibility of electoral monitors and the voters roll, permit fair campaigning of political parties, accredit media and other groups to monitor on the day of the election and analyse the entire process as a whole.

Both the constitutional referendum and the next presidential and general elections are highly dependent on this body.

Benchmark 3: Media Freedom

Advocates for free speech and an independent media experienced a breakthrough when the GNU, in May 2010, awarded licences to four independent daily newspapers127. Consequently, it is essential that efforts to control the media, as occurred in the past decade, to maintain authoritarian rule do not re-emerge under the pretext of media reform.

The government needs to eliminate the draconian laws that unnecessarily infringe upon the operation of the press including:

The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, which prevents media

organisations from hiring unaccredited journalists;

The Public Order and Security Act which has been widely used to prosecute critics of the president, his government and policies; and

The Broadcasting Services Act, which sets such complex requirements for registering

broadcast media that the government-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation

remains the only station on the airwaves.

Benchmark 4: Constitutional Reform Process

The constitutional reform process is the second to take place in a decade. (The 2000 constituional draft), notable for allowing the government to seize land without compensation and the entrenchment of executive power, was defeated by a referendum.

Similar to the 2000 process, an outreach programme has been conducted nationwide to gauge the concerns of citizens and incorporate their input into a new constitutional draft to stand before a new referendum.

A new constitution is a clear deliverable. However, the country is highly polarised at the present with reports of violence and intimidation taking place.

The current atmosphere is not conducive to creating a perfect document. Rather, it is more likely that a new constitution will lead to a revised document at a later date.

Nevertheless, the international community, through direct government-to-government

contact and nongovernmental organisations, should offer technical support with the aim of including an encompassing Bill of Rights and separation of powers within the new draft.

Benchmark 5: Land Audit

A two-year land audit that was scheduled to begin in early 2010 was threatened and blocked by Zanu (PF) and the war veterans. Mugabe has consistently argued that he is righting the wrongs of the colonial era in which land policies were discriminatory and land distribution was unequal.

Mugabe and Zanu-PF have boxed the land issue within the context of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism.

Minister of Lands and Land Resettlement Hebert Murerwa posited that the audit would assess activities on the ground, land uptake, production levels, availability of water sources and other related issues. The European Commission has offered to fund the audit, and insists the process should be “inclusive, transparent and comprehensive.

The composition of any land commission needs to consist of local, regional and international experts to achieve widespread legitimacy. The appointment of an international mediator should be considered. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annans mediation in Kenyas power-sharing deal following the 2007 crises should be used as a paradigm.

Benchmark 6: Security sector reform

The real issue, according to Prime Minister Tsvangirai, is the power paradigm; in other words, the smooth and peaceful transfer of power should Zanu (PF) lose in the next elections. Restrictive measures must be used to get those in Zanu (PF) to accept the will of the people.

Security sector reform remains the most potentially destabilising and outstanding issue to be addressed by the GNU. An arms embargo was first implemented by the UK, shortly after the discovery of a hit list in which 1,500 farmers of British descent were targeted for forced land seizures.

The embargoes were ill-informed as they had forced those within the security sector to further embed themselves with Zanu (PF) whose members had come under similar restrictions. There has been no movement towards implementing security sector reforms aspects captured in the GPA.

The West should position themselves behind South Africa, as a member of the SADC, to drive forward the issue of genuine security sector reform. For example, Mbeki sent a delegation of generals to Zimbabwe in 2008 to assess the role of the security forces in political violence and to determine how the forces could eventually be reformed.

The West should encourage South African President Zuma to send a similar delegation to build on Mbekis previous initiative. Chief South African facilitator, Mac Maharaj, should be encouraged to see that the JOC is dismantled.

Additionally, the West should motivate the SADC, vis–vis South Africa, to devise a role for Mac Maharaj, or a person of similar stature and knowledge of Zimbabwe, to attend NSC meetings to monitor progress and facilitate solutions to matters that arise.

Finally, security forces need to disengage from the electoral processes; in particular individuals with security sector ties should be removed from the Electoral and Constitutional Commissions.

Conclusion

It is crucial that countries within the EU, the United States, Norway, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand reach a common strategy on any future movement in regard to restrictive measures and engage those countries that flout the restrictive measures. Equally important is the Commonwealths role, particularly with its North-South membership and the participation of member states within the SADC, the AU and the UN.

Zanu (PF) has and will notice cracks within the international community and is likely to try to exploit any policy discrepancies as it tried to do when former Swedish Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Sten Rylander, stated, I am disappointed that I have to leave with most of the restrictive measures still in place.

There has been a shift in policy toward Zimbabwe by the international community. Restrictive measures have been eased on some individuals and the USA is currently considering two bills:

ZDERA 2010145 to replace ZIDERA as well as the Zimbabwe Sanctions Repeal Act of 2010 that seeks to end directives for the USA to oppose and vote against any extension of loans, credit or guarantees to the Government of Zimbabwe as well as any debt cancellation or reduction owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution.

The EU continues high-level delegation visits aimed at the renormalisation of relations, and countries have formed a Friends of Zimbabwe to assist Zimbabwe in its transformation. Re-engagement between Zimbabwe and the West must be coordinated with the GNU participants and with South Africa.

Tying benchmarks to restrictive measures will reaffirm the international communitys commitment to Zimbabwes political and economic wellbeing and maintain a degree of influence over the countrys transformation.

This is an abridged version of a report titled: Restrictive Measures and Zimbabwe: Political Implications, Economic Impact and a Way Forward, released recently by IDASA. The IDASA is an independent public interest organisation committed to building sustainable democratic societies in collaboration with African and global partners.