Mzila-Ndlovu was soon joined in jail by another advocate for justice for Gukurahundi victims, Father Marko Mnkhandla. A more cynical and punitive discrediting of ONHRI – an institution set up under the Global Political Agreement – would be difficult to find.
Perhaps nothing symbolises more dramatically the dysfunctionality of certain institutions under the Inclusive Government than this deliberate assault by the state security establishment (sometimes termed securocrats) on an institution ostensibly set up to work towards transitional justice and national healing.
High hopes
Yet there had initially been high hopes that the advent of the IG would herald a new era of democratic transition and a decline in political violence. Indeed, the IG text itself stated that the parties agreed to ‘renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, and take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions they control are not engaged in violence’.
It went on to state that prosecuting authorities would expedite, where sufficient evidence existed, the prosecution of people accused of politically-related offences arising out of, or connected with, the March and June elections of 2008. The ONHRI, was set up specifically to advise on what measures ‘might be necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of victims of pre- and post- independence political conflicts’.
But very little headway has been made in addressing either contemporary or historical violence. Despite individual efforts by ministers such as Mzila-Ndlovu, ONHRI has found it very difficult to earn credibility for its mission and activities in the wider Zimbabwean society.
African nationalism
The roots of violence can be traced to colonial state structures and practices, which ruthlessly suppressed moderate African nationalism in the 1950s, with the unintended consequence of fostering a more radical, uncompromising African nationalism in the 1960s. The arsenal of the colonial state included sjamboks, dogs, guns and poison as well as torture against nationalist activists and liberation fighters.
Most of these weapons and repressive techniques were inherited by the new state in 1980. To these were added the tradition of nationalist inter-party violence, which had initially spread in the 1960s and had been rejuvenated after independence. The significance of the post-independence era was the greater scale of violence, drawing on immense state resources that resulted in pogroms such as Gukurahundi and the repression of both opposition parties and also civil society organisations, especially after 2000.
Terror
Inter-party violence and terror reached its peak between 2000 and 2008 when Zanu (PF) increasingly utilised state agencies, war veterans and militia during election campaigns. Hundreds of opposition party activists and supporters, mainly from MDC-T, were killed in the 2000, 2002 and 2008 elections while thousands were injured and thousands more displaced. The intensity and ferocity of the violence resulted in the discrediting of the 2008 run-off presidential election.
As the country heads towards another election, the tempo of inter-party violence appears to be increasing. In the wider society, this has had the effect of triggering terror and reviving the trauma of 2008.
Another major dimension of political violence is what is sometimes termed intra-party violence, which has rocked Zanu (PF) as well as the two MDC factions. Although usually mild and non-fatal, this mode of violence often rears its ugly head during party primary elections.
While preparing for its April 2011 congress, MDC-T experienced widely reported violence between groups contending for top provincial positions in Bulawayo and Masvingo. This has prompted anxiety about what has been termed the ‘zanufication’ of the party with respect to the use of violence to resolve political disputes.
Internal conflicts
This followed similar intra-party violence in Zanu (PF) in the build-up to its annual conference in 2009. This culture of violence even seems to have begun to spread to some civic organisations, such as student and youth groups, and even to churches such as the Anglican Church – with internal conflicts threatening to tear them apart.
Thus, consciously or unconsciously, the culture and method of violence – once the monopoly of Zanu (PF) – seem to have been adopted by other parties and civic institutions.
An ominous development, especially since 2008, has been the use of political violence in the format of economic penalties against opponents. This became a weapon of choice against rural and urban MDC-T supporters during the presidential run-off campaign in 2008.
For example, property such as cattle, goats, maize and farming equipment was confiscated by Zanu (PF) supporters and militia, especially in rural areas. Extensive case-studies on this economic victimization have been carried out by organisations like the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ, 2009) and the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2009).
Economic penalties
In a sense, economic penalties against opposition members were not a completely new phenomenon. They were already discriminated against by being denied food aid that is channelled through state and Zanu (PF) structures. What was a new and sinister element was the expropriation of assets that support victims’ livelihoods for unlawful gain by perpetrators. Communities experienced politically motivated economic sanctions and taxes such as these against opposition supporters on a systematic scale.
Sooner or later, both political and economic violence was bound to provoke retaliatory violence from those that had borne its brunt. In 2009 and 2010, there were reports of some rural communities reclaiming their confiscated or looted property, including livestock. In some instances, this resulted in intra- community violence during which police and state authorities tended to side with those linked to Zanu (PF). The cycle of violence continues precisely because impunity is tolerated by state agencies, whose role should be to protect the law and rights of victims.
Democratic transition
The ambitious hopes to address political violence and partisan policing, as spelt out in the GPA, remain largely unfulfilled. This is not to say that important hopes and objectives should be abandoned, such as the injunctions that:
• state organs do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties;
• all state organs and institutions should strictly observe the principle of the Rule of Law and remain non- partisan and impartial; and,
• recruitment policies and practices should be conducted in a manner that ensures that no political or other form of favouritism is practised. (GPA, 2008)
One of the major obstacles preventing a democratic transition – as was the case during the 2008 elections – is that certain state institutions oppose it and continue to resist the implementation of key provisions of the GPA. They have undermined new institutions such as ONHRI and blocked the professionalisation of the police, the intelligence service and the military.
Yet the agenda and momentum for transitional justice and security sector reform should continue to be supported. Zimbabwe is a deeply scarred society whose psyche has been shaped by over a half century of state and party violence. Mobilised and controlled through various militaristic operations, such as Operation Murambatsvina, Zimbabwe is a traumatised society in dire need of an end to the cycle of violence and of a transition from the current authoritarianism to a genuinely open and tolerant democracy. – First published by OSISA www.osisa.org
Post published in: Politics