21.10.2023 10:12
by Staff Reporter

SADC’s SEAC Dispute Resolution Protocols Arising From SEOM’s Final Report On Zimbabwe

In line with the conclusions reached in SEOM's Final Report as articulated in the analysis highlighted below

@SADC_News @HHichilema @PresidencyZA @CyrilRamaphosa @_AfricanUnion @nelsonchamisa @CCCZimbabwe @Sophie_Mokoena @euinzim @UNZimbabwe @ZECzim

1. In line with the conclusions reached in SEOM’s Final Report as articulated in the analysis highlighted below, attention is hereby drawn to SADC and SADC leaders to the fact that there are grounds for SEAC’s involvement in Zimbabwe based on an electoral dispute between the ruling party, ZANU PF and the opposition, CCC.

2. It is patently clear that – it is impossible for that dispute to be resolved using internal remedies due to the current regime’s capture of key state institutions, including the Judiciary, as recorded in Section 7.9 of SEOM’s Final Report.

3. The process involving SEOM has clearly come to an end and its woeful shortcomings have been laid bare via the clearly inadequate recommendations that it has given to a party to a dispute which has benefited unfairly from subverting the very legal framework which is designed to avoid disputed elections.

4. An additional aggravating factor is that the recommendations that were made in 2018 are still outstanding 5 years later, which clearly suggests a clear lack of political will to implement them.

5. Another aggravating feature is that Zimbabwe has got a history of disputed elections, which have often been violent and seen the loss of life with the state often at the centre it all. We even experienced the region’s only coup as recently as November 2017, which shows a propensity for things to get out of hand.

6. In this election cycle, SEOM clearly documented and observed the involvement of a shadowy state entity, FAZ, deliberately tasked with subverting the electoral processes.

7. It also documented @ZECzim clear falsehoods pertaining to its claimed readiness to hold the harmonised elections, particularly the issue of ballot papers which were withheld pursuant to disenfranchising millions of voters in opposition strongholds.

8. The entire electoral process was a charade in capable of being verified. Some of the independent bodies capable of tabulating the results such as @ZESN1 were deliberately targeted and unlawfully derailed on the eve of the announcement of election results, with their equipment being seized in a cynical ploy to eradicate any possibility of exposing electoral theft.

9. In the post election environment period, the state has systematically targeted leading opposition officials on trumped up charges. It has also used another compromised state institution, the office of the Speaker of Parliament, to engineer recalls of opposition MPs unlawfully.

10. It is now impossible to use lawful means to either hold the regime to account or seek a constitutional change of government. Opponents are arbitrarily arrested and the persistent denial of bail is used as a harsh and punitive tool pursuant to sending a chilling warning to political opponents on the cost of dissent, with senior opposition politician & lawyer @JobSikhala1 being a good example of this treatment as he will soon be clocking an incredible 500 days in remand prison on trumped up charges.

11. The current President and those close to him are extra ordinarily powerful and incapable of being held to account by any state institution in Zimbabwe.

12. Any peaceful protests are likely to end in live ammunition being used as we saw on 1 August 2018 – and recommendations from a Commission of Inquiry that was instituted at the President’s own behest, the Motlanthe Commission Report, have never been implemented.

13. There is simply no reasonable prospect of a free, fair and credible election being undertaken in Zimbabwe under the current regime and electoral body.

14. It should not have to be the case that people are forced to go on the streets to fight and secure their democratic right to a free, fair and credible election in Zimbabwe.

15. The SEOM Final Report is clear. The SEAC process is clear. SADC does not have a discretion. Once a dispute has been raised, it has to be resolved swiftly. That SEAC process allows non-state actors such as @CCCZimbabwe to trigger a dispute and receive an entitlement to the resolution of that dispute after all parties have been heard.

16. SADC should not abdicate its responsibility to safeguard democracy and good governance which underpin the consolidation of peace and stability in the region. If SADC is able to tame a powerful protagonist such as the current Zimbabwean regime, it will go a long way towards preventing future crises in the region through arresting impunity.


[15/10, 20:54] Simbai Homer: The SEOM Final Report On Zimbabwean Elections – Elections Designed To Be Stolen? Has @SADC_News Abandoned Zimbabwe?

Caution – Extremely Long Read – Summary To Be Provided Later

@HHichilema @SADC_News @CCCZimbabwe @nelsonchamisa @CyrilRamaphosa @PresidencyZA @Sophie_Mokoena @ChrisMaroleng @_AfricanUnion @MYANC @euinzim @UNZimbabwe @ZECzim @joseph_kalimbwe @Julius_S_Malema @MmusiMaimane @SABCNews @TimesLIVE

SEOM Final Report
The most relevant sections are, 7, dealing with issues raised by & the SEOM Observations, 8, dealing with Observations on Election Days (23-24 August 2023), 9 dealing with the Post-Election Phase, 11, dealing with the developments arising from the Election Results, 12 dealing with SADC Electoral Observation Mission Recommendations & 13, dealing with the conclusions.

Key Sections & Conclusions
At 7.1.3, SEOM notes that ZEC’s impartiality was in contention by virtue of the alleged inclusion of 4 Commissioners alleged to be ‘close relatives of high-ranking leaders of ZANU PF’.

It goes on to state that it had been unable to verify the above. It does not explain how & why this happened as these appointments are a matter of public record & could have been addressed by @ZECzim.

It concludes that such a development, if true (which it is), “has the potential to affect the independence or the perception of their independence, and compromise the Commission’s impartiality in line with section 11(2) of the Electoral Act, and section 4.1.9 of the SADC Principles and Guidelines.”

That is clearly a significant finding which has got the potential to taint the integrity of the whole process.

7.2 – Delimitation at 7.2.1 (b) & (c) it is clear that SEOM concluded that ZEC breached S161(6) of the of the Constitution by inflating the average number of voters in each constituency which by extension distorted the size of each constituency in terms of the total number of voters & polling stations allocated to it.

7.3 – Voters Roll – at 7.3.1 (f) SEOM concludes that @ZECzim failed to comply with the Constitution in the provision of the Voters Roll to stakeholders, finding that it had hidden behind the obscure Cyber & Data Protection Act, thereby negating the requirement for transparent & fair elections with the steep fees charged for accessing a printed copy creating additional restrictions.

The above shows that @ZECzim went to great lengths to prevent access to the voters’ roll by key stakeholders, conduct which is consistent with a conspiracy to prevent transparency and leads to stolen elections / manipulated results.

7.4 – Nomination of candidates and nomination fees – SEOM noted the extremely high fees that @zeczim introduced which had an impact on two female candidates as well as @Hon_Kasukuwere highly controversial disqualification from contesting as a presidential candidate, which benefited the incumbent.

The steep fees were introduced against the backdrop of the main opposition @CCCZimbabwe being denied access to funding via the Political Parties Finance Act after their precursor party, MDCA was hijacked by the Zimbabwean regime’s proxy & went on to receive the funds instead.

The net result would have been the new party’s failure to field all or enough candidates nationwide. This creates an objective basis to accuse @zeczim to have been complicit in that chicanery.

Freedom of Assembly at 7.5, Freedom of Expression at 7.6, Freedom of Association at 7.7 & participation of women as candidates at 7.8 are all decidedly clear in terms of how the government flagrantly breached legislative provisions relating to this. @ZECzim took no remedial action & was complicit at all material times.

At 7.9, SEOM noted the brazen & gratuitous payments that had been made to Judges on the eve of the election & their impact on the independence of the Judiciary given the underlying perception that they were being used “to buy the loyalty and allegiance of the judiciary.”

We will revisit the above later in light of the SEOM’s recommendations.

At 7.10.1, SEOM noted & was informed of the alleged intimidation of voters, particularly rural voters by a quasi-securico regime affiliated shadowy group – Forever Associates (FAZ) deployed to about 36 000 villages.

Despite the group’s national presence & brazen operations, @ZECzim feigned ignorance about it’s existence, which is disingenuous & consistent with it being complicit.

At 7.10.2, SEOM notes that @zeczim’s initial denial of knowledge of the group before elections was later conveniently acknowledged after the elections, after the damage had already been done.

SEOM noted the reports of intimidation and coercion involving postal votes from the Police at 7.11.1 but @zeczim never intervened at the time or anytime thereafter.

There is no point in addressing the lack of coverage of elections by state media recorded at 7.12 and lack of diaspora voting at 7.13 as these are ubiquitous and common cause.

At 7.14, the lack of transparency in the procurement and printing of the ballot papers was highlighted – this goes to the core of the credibility & integrity of the election as it affects the verification & reconciliation of vote tallies.

In line with the pattern highlighted earlier, @zeczim chose to proceed with secrecy rather than transparency, conduct which is consistent with manipulating results.

When it comes to observations, at 8.1(iii), SEOM noted that only 64% of the voting stations observed opened on time. Not that this is just of those observed, which were more accessible!

Some of them opened more than 12 hours after the allotted time with this occurring mainly in Harare & Bulawayo. By 6am on 24 August, some had still not voted while some slept at Polling Stations & others went home.

Incredibly, @zeczim cited the unavailability of ballot papers as the reason even though at 4.2 of the Report it was recorded that it had said that it was ready to hold the elections and it never went back to SEOM to update it about a change in the situation – especially something as significant as that.

SEOM concludes that this had the “unfortunate effect of creating doubts about the credibility of this electoral process.” This simply means the result is not credible or reliable, especially as the turnout ended up dropping to 68.8%, including in the affected areas.

Other key transgressions which exacerbated the situation includes that 26% of the polling stations observed not all voters who came to vote were able to, again this is just those observed, the figure could be much higher, at 3% of those observed, indelible ink was not checked on voters before allowing them to vote (creating a risk of inflating votes).

By far the most explosive observations made and conclusions reached by SEOM relates to the notorious issue of FAZ cited earlier. At 8.1(a)(xiii) it says:

“Our observers confirmed the existence of this group as its officials or agents were easily identifiable at some polling stations as they were dressed in regalia emblazoned with the FAZ name and were accredited local observers.

These and other unidentified persons who were not polling officials were also observed taking down the voters’ names before they cast their votes. In some areas, voters were intimidated by the actions of these individuals.

The SEOM noted section 4.1.4 of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, which calls upon Member States to take all necessary measures and precautions to prevent intimidation.

The Mission further noted that Section 2 of the Fourth Schedule of the Electoral Act (Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates and other Stakeholders) which provides that the legitimacy of a government born out of democratic multi-party-political activity rests on, among other things, that the political environment is at all times free of violence, coercion and intimidation …”

It is submitted that the above observations are sufficient to invalidate the Zimbabwean Elections either on their own or cumulatively with the evidence cited earlier.

They also put paid to @ZECzim’s shameful & incredible attempts at feigning ignorance of FAZ’s existence and its patently brazen & unlawful activities which have got a direct bearing on the freeness, fairness, integrity & credibility of the whole electoral process & the results that ZEC declared.

It follows that if FAZ were accredited as local observers (itself a farce), then ZEC would have had official knowledge about its existence and their denials were hollow, in bad faith and amounted to deliberately misleading or supplying false information to SEOM, which is serious charge given that the chairperson is a Zimbabwean High Court Judge.

Furthermore, the very fact that SEOM saw them operating openly and intimidating voters means @zeczim also did but failed to intervene or officially note this.

At 8.1(a)(xiv), SEOM records that they observed the closing and vote counting processes and found the following examples, (cross section of concerning ones) – (i) 93% of polling stations did not have results posted outside, (k) The counting process proceeded uninterrupted in 86% of the polling stations, (meaning interruption in 14% of them, (l) There was adequate lighting to ensure proper counting processes in 93% of the polling stations, (meaning inadequate provision in 7%) of them, which undermines the integrity of the process by a sufficient margin as to taint the outcome.

In relation to the post-election phase in Section 9, SEOM has missed the wanton targeting and persecution of opposition elected officials.

In terms of the recommendations made by SEOM via Section 12 of the Report, it is submitted that they are lamentably weak, inappropriate and ineffective in light of the significant failings highlighted above.

Thus for instance, in 12.2, SEOM says it “reiterates the urgent need for all stakeholders to consider and implement outstanding recommendations that were made following the 2018 electoral cycle.”

Since the stakeholders include the opposition who are levelling charges of an unfree and unfair election, and given the failure of the regime to implement the 2018 recommendations which it has then profited from, how credible is it that any such recommendations will be implemented?

In relation to charges of partiality levelled against @zeczim, in 12.2(b), SEOM recommends that it should “consider adopting a pro-active communication strategy …”, why would ZEC do that if the objective behind its partiality is to facilitate delivery of a pre-determined outcome in favour of the incumbent?

The same applies to postal voting, voting rights for the diaspora, public media bias and the timeframe for announcing legislative election results.

To its credit, at 12.3(b) pertaining to Independence of ZEC, it zooms in on the issue of allegations of ZEC Commissioners being related to senior members of the ruling party and records that this violates S11(2) of the Electoral Act and S4.1.9 of the SADC Principles and Guidelines – recommending that this be considered as one of the disqualification criteria in recruitment of ZEC officials.

This is still woefully adequate as it does not address what the consequences of their involvement would be in the recent elections and why SEOM did not seek to exhaust its investigations in establishing the veracity of the allegations given their seriousness.

Its tantamount to evading responsibility on sensitive matters, which suggests a lack of being proactive in addressing conflicts.

In terms of the Conclusion in Section 13, the observations and conclusions reached are riddled with shortcomings, inaccuracies and diplomatic niceties while short of practical, effective remedies.

13.1 talks about the election having been conducted in “a peaceful, orderly and exemplary manner” but this is charade as it directly SEOM’s own observations pertaining to shameful delays in I deployment of ballot papers in 36% of the areas that it observed and the nefarious and downright unlawful activities of FAZ in 36 000 villages and ZEC’s complicity in enabling that behaviour by turning a blind eye to it.

The above clearly undermines SEOM’s credibility and integrity and leaves it open to charges of succumbing to the unprecedented hectoring and hostility that ruling party officials directed towards it following the Preliminary Report.

The same charges can be laid against it in Section 3.2 in relation to the tribute that it pays to the politicians given that the incumbent openly threatened political opponents ahead of his inauguration and some of his senior officials threatened political opponents, including a Senior Police Officer without any repercussions.

In Section 13.3 it conveniently records that “some aspects of that Harmonised Elections fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2021)” basing this on what it records in Sections 6 & 7 of the Report.

A closer look at those Sections shows significant failings which go to the core of freeness, fairness and the credibility of the elections yet SEOM failed to engage with the very pertinent question of whether or not the respective threshold had been crossed in respect of this.

It’s a clear duck which is tantamount to an own goal by SEOM, a historic, monumental and generational evasion of responsibility. It is the elephant in the room.

It is submitted that once SEOM details the events it does in Sections 6 & 7, the next logical step is to address whether or not the threshold for a free, fair and credible election had been met or not.

From then on, it would then have had to address what the consequences would be. It is recommended that this is a crucial step which it should be mandatory to address in all future SEOM Reports if democratic standards are to be improve and progress and stability is to be attained within the region.

That such a crucial step was missed at such a level points to a high likelihood of a diplomatic impasse or lack of consensus on addressing the matter – with officials perhaps rightly fearful of triggering a fierce diplomatic backlash from the regime in Zimbabwe, as opposed to being an innocent oversight.

In Section 13.4, the recommendation that “The SEOM calls for all concerned parties to ensure that any grievances with respect to the election results are channelled through the appropriate legal processes to ensure the exhaustion of domestic legal remedies” lacks credibility as an effective remedy given that it contradicts SEOM’s own detailed reference in Section 7.9 pertaining to concerns from some stakeholders pertaining to the lack of independence of the Judiciary as well as its post-election phase observation in Section 9.3(b) where it records @CCCZimbabwe reluctance in pursuing the challenge through the court process for that reason.

It is thus submitted that SEOM has failed to rise to the occasion through using its mandate to decisively intervene in Zimbabwe to safeguard democracy, enhance good governance and preserve peace and stability within the region before the situation has escalated to dangerous levels.

It is further submitted that the recommendations that SADC via SEOM have made are only appropriate in situations where minor transgressions have been made.

It is recommended that in situations like Zimbabwe where there is an established pattern of repeated violations & subversions of electoral and democratic norms and elections are rendered a farce through impunity and the systematic capturing of all key state institutions, the SEAC Dispute Resolution Process / Mechanism be triggered, as it is more likely to treat the two parties to the dispute as equals, has more latitude concerning to sanctions that can be applied, allows for a swifter resolution of the dispute and is less prone to manipulation by a state party acting in bad faith.

It is further submitted that SEOM’s Final Report emphatically makes it clear that there was no free, fair and credible election in Zimbabwe.

This means that the government that is currently in power is not legitimate as it does not reflect the will of the people.

The incumbent cannot be allowed to benefit from intimidation and subverting the electoral processes with the clear connivance of a hopelessly compromised and partial electoral body, ZEC.

Such a compromised body can surely not be tasked with the responsibility to oversee reforms given that it lacks integrity and the capacity to act in good faith.

The evidence captured in the Report further suggests that, at all material times, ZEC consistently sought to avoid transparency, prevent scrutiny of key electoral materials such as ballot papers and the voters roll, subvert key processes such as the Delimitation process and actively disenfranchise voters in opposition strongholds while misleading SEOM about its readiness to hold the harmonised elections.

The people of Zimbabwe have suffered enough. A flawed process can only lead to a flawed and illegitimate outcome, meaning that a fresh, free and fair election presided over by a new independent & freshly constituted body is the only just and acceptable outcome.

The fact that the Zimbabwean regime is powerful and able to intimidate its political opponents makes the case for intervention even more urgent unless if SADC wants to wait for an implosion to take place first before intervening.


[15/10, 20:54] Simbai Homer: Way Forward After The SEOM’s Final Report

1. Many Zimbabweans have been asking what the way forward should now be following the conclusion of the SEOM process.

2. My answer is that @nelsonchamisa & @CCCZimbabwe should move swiftly to register a dispute with SADC using the SEAC process which provides for registration of disputes by non-state actors.

3. Unlike the SEOM process, there is no discretion involved in dealing with such a dispute and all parties to that dispute are treated equally, while provision is also made for its swift resolution.

4. The mechanics surrounding how the dispute is raised can obviously not be shared here given the sensitivity involved.

5. The options available in terms of how the dispute can be resolved are much broader and not as constraining as the situation under the SEOM process which the regime in Zimbabwe obviously treats with contempt.

6. It is not enough to simply raise the dispute. Zimbabweans in general and the opposition in particular should then seek to dramatise that dispute diplomatically & constitutionally, including via sustained, collective peaceful street protests, so that there is no mismatch between an ongoing SEAC process and the prevailing political environment on the ground like we have seen with the SEOM process.

7. It is obvious and natural that the regime will seek to oppose any peaceful protests, including via a swift and brutal response using a combination of live ammunition and dragnet like arbitrary arrests and prolonged denial of bail.

8. That is why it’s important to mobilise successfully & to conquer fear, which is a state of mind. ED’s generation had to walk many miles on foot and challenged an equally brutal Smith regime. It’s where the entitlement to want to rule for life comes from.

9. There is nothing that @nelsonchamisa can do on his own. If he leads from the front, he will simply either be shot or arrested straight away, to be detained indefinitely which will effectively be the end of the opposition movement and clearly what the regime would want.

10. If you ask me, I do not want revolutions. I would rather the regime swallows its pride, stops the nonsense that it is currently engaging in via the Speaker’s office, and allows SADC to mediate to pave the road for a free, fair & credible election.

11. We know that it won’t, and we know that the current situation is not sustainable, so something will have to give. There is no point in engaging in peaceful protests if the numbers are not sufficient.

12. If the opposition fails to exact a political cost or challenge the regime peacefully but effectively, then that will be the end of it. People will lose faith in it and in elections, giving way to radicals, most likely in the ruling party or the security cluster emerging in the lead up to 2028, if the situation holds for that long.

13. Regrettably, the current opposition policy of disengagement from Parliament is inadequate to meet the scale of the challenge.

14. It creates confusion to it’s constituency via inconsistencies and presents no political cost to the regime or the ruling elite.

15. An adequate response was desperately needed to the electoral heist nearer the event to take advantage of the then prevailing momentum and the SADC SEOM process.

16. The nationwide consultations were strategic and absolutely critical to conscientise and drum up support but they have now been overtaken by the Tshabangu debacle which presents an existential challenge creating an even more imperative for a powerful & defiant response without which credibility and morale will dissipate – and by the way, it’s not an easy assignment by any stretch of the imagination, it’s
clearly a generational challenge given that the situation has reached another level!

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